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18 March 1981

East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1859

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CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Soviet Bloc Military Moves Reported
(Jean-Paul Picaper; LE FIGARO, 4 Dec 80) 1

'L'HUMANITE' Cites V. Zagladin's Comments on Poland
(L'HUMANITE, 19 Dec 80) 2

Briefs
BCP Delegation in Poland 3
Poland-USSR Cinematograph Cooperation 3

POLAND

Poll Notes Type of Authority Wanted
(Jacek Maziarski; KULTURA, 25 Jan 81) 4

CGT Delegation Meets With Walesa in Gdansk
(Jacques Dimet; L'HUMANITE, 8 Jan 81) 11

CGT Delegation Meeting With Trade Unionists, Bishop Dabrowski Noted
(Jacques Dimet; L'HUMANITE, 10 Jan 81) 13

Solidarity Leaders From Around Country Give Views
(DAGENS NYHETER, 22 Feb 81) 15

Soviet Customs Officials Increase Harassment of Travellers
(Staffan Teste; DAGENS NYHETER, 16 Feb 81) 22

Sweden To Increase Export Guarantee Aid
(DAGENS NYHETER, 14 Feb 81) 24

Journalist Organization's Fikus Discusses Congress, Reforms
(Dariusz Fikus Interview; DAGENS NYHETER, 6 Feb 81) 26

'ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI' on Kuron's Vision of Polish Future
(ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, 15-16 Nov 80) 30

Briefs
Printers Train With Stockholm Newspaper 32

YUGOSLAVIA

Republics' Agreement on Army Development, Defense Goals, 1981-84
(SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, 31 Dec 80) 33

Republics' Agreement on Military Weapons, Equipment Production 1981-85
(SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, 31 Dec 80) 47

Bilic Discusses Dissidents, Opposition, Church
(Jure Bilic; VJESNIK, 19 Feb 80)..... 54

SOVIET BLOC MILITARY MOVES REPORTED

LD051245 Paris LE FIGARO in French 4 Dec 80 p 3

[Jean-Paul Picaper Bonn Dispatch: "Major Psychological Maneuvers in GDR"]

[Excerpt] Some reports have aroused interest and have not been denied. They are: that Czechoslovak troops have taken up positions in Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia [sentence as published]. In Slovakia, they have been joined by some Hungarian troops. The Czechoslovak and East German armies are on the alert. The East German army has ordered partial mobilization, recalling many reservists, and, finally, in the GDR, a "cordon" has been established at a distance of 15-20 km from the Polish border, with road and rail controls.

This control cordon formed by the Volkspolizei runs from Greifswald in the North to Cottbus and Lobau in the South.

East Germans who do not live in that sector must report their movements. All leave in the East German army has been stopped indefinitely, and the men called up do not know whether they will spend Christmas and New Years day at home. And, finally, workers' militia commanders have been ordered to put their men on alert. They have told manual and office workers and cadres belonging to these parliamentary units to phone in their movements and addresses whenever they leave their places of work. These measures have, in particular, been applied to the E. Thaelmann and K. Liebknecht combines in Magdeburg, the Germann Matern Enterprise in Dresden, the Gorlitz Railcar Construction Plant and 25 other big enterprises.

In Leipzig, Dresden and Erfurt bezirke all regular army reservists rejoined their units by Tuesday night. The date set for the conclusion of the "maneuvers"--9 December--applies to Soviet troops only. However, it confirms a general impression that an invasion of Poland is possible but not certain.

CSO: 3100

'L'HUMANITE' CITES V. ZAGLADIN'S COMMENTS ON POLAND

LD231315 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 19 Dec 80 p 9

[Unattributed report: "Poland Is Doing Everything Necessary to Solve its Problems Democracically"]

[Text] Vadim Zagladin, Deputy Chief of the CPSU International Section, answered questions asked by French television Channel One journalists at noon yesterday.

First the Soviet official noted with "satisfaction" the existence of "good relations" between France and the USSR and the "desire to see them further improved."

Questioned on the USSR's assessment of the situation in Poland, Vadim Zagladin recalled the terms of the text adopted in Moscow during the recent meeting of Warsaw Pact member countries, namely, that "they are convinced that the Polish communists, working class and workers will be able to overcome the difficulties and guarantee the country's socialist development." Vadim Zagladin confirmed that "socialist Poland and the Polish people can count firmly on the Warsaw Pact member countries' solidarity and support."

The Soviet official went on to state: "We hope that the Poles will do everything themselves. I believe that the latest events in Poland bear out that assessment. The Poles are able to do things themselves. I note that in the West the forces which would like a destabilization and change of regime in Poland are disappointed. Poland has problems and is doing everything necessary to solve them in a democratic way."

Referring to the NATO discussions on the situation in Poland Vadim Zagladin stressed their extravagant nature. Just imagine, he said, if the Warsaw Pact organization had discussed the situation in France in 1968 on the pretext that it was unsettled, would that not rightly have been regarded as unacceptable interference?

Questioned finally on the aid which Poland needs, Vadim Zagladin replied: "Poland is receiving aid, notably economic aid, from the USSR which amounts to large sums. This aid is both political and moral. I have just learned that the EEC yesterday decided to send food products to Poland. That is the right kind of gesture."

CSO: 3100

BRIEFS

BCP DELEGATION IN POLAND--PAP--A working group of the BCP Central Committee, including the head of the Central Committee Organization Department, G. Grigorev, was in Poland from 26-30 January. Talks were held in the PZPR Central Committee with the participation of the head of the Central Committee Organization Department, A. Barzyk, in the IPPM-L [Institute of Basic Problems of Marxism-Leninism], and also in Lodz, Piotrkow [Piotrkow Trybunalski] and Warsaw. The subject of the talks was the exchange of experiences in BCP and PZPR activities in improving the style and method of party work as well as preparations for the approaching XII BCP and IX Extraordinary PZPR Congress. Z. Kurowski, PZPR Central Committee secretary, received the working group at the end of their visit. The ambassador of Bulgaria, Ivan Nedev, was also present. [Text] [Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 31 Jan-1 Feb 81 p 6]

POLAND-USSR CINEMATOGRAPH COOPERATION--The USSR State Committee for Cinematography and the Polish Ministry of Culture have signed an agreement in Moscow detailing cooperation for this year. Moviegoers should expect many interesting events. Days of Polish and Soviet cinema will be held and work will continue in making joint features, documentary, and popular science films. [Text] [Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2100 GMT 11 Feb 81 LD]

CSO: 1800

POLL NOTES TYPE OF AUTHORITY WANTED

Warsaw KULTURA in Polish No 4, 25 Jan 81 pp 1,8

[Article by Jacek Maziarski: "Do We Want Strong Authority?"]

[Text] The prolonged crisis exposes our collective consciousness to a severe test. The dramatic economic situation and the sociopolitical tension cause ups and downs of the public mood. For several months, there has been an oscillation between the poles of overly easy optimism and panicky despair. The reactions of public opinion are unstable and characterized by internal dissention; hopes collide with uncertainty.

The feeling of threat is rather clearly concentrated on two points. The first is the fear of economic disaster with all its possible consequences. The second is, in a way, an extension of the first and it boils down to the fear of progressing confusion in the economy and public life: many of the citizenry simply fear the destabilization of the state.

We can spare ourselves a detailed discussion of the production and market background of the social unrest. Plenty has been written on this subject and sufficient reason for the poor state of morale is what we see every day at work and in the stores. The Public Opinion Research Center (OBOP) data show that at the end of November 1980, 38 percent of those polled expected an improvement in economic conditions (while in mid-September, 59 percent still cherished hope for an improvement).

Less well-recognized and probably an underestimated problem is the second point: the fear of uncontrolled slippage of the state structure. A sizeable sector of public opinion feels overwhelmed by the vision of growing anarchy. Every sixth Pole (data as of the end of November) takes under consideration that the strike wave will grow and the chaos will increase. If we add all the others who are afraid of the confrontation, of the "power-clash" scenario of events (including the military variant), we learn that on 25 November 1980 almost exactly half of the sample representing the society (49 percent of those polled by OBOD) were worried by the prospect of destabilization of and threat to the state.

I am not emphasizing the date of the survey by accident. These was the public mood at the end of November and it is well known that the results of public opinion polls depend very much on events at the time of polls. At the beginning

of 1981, the feeling of threat to the state system might have diminished but I do not think that it could have been considered insignificant. To the contrary, I think that the undercurrent of unease was deeper than could be perceived from the cited data and that it will resurface in the future.

My prognostication is based on a fairly obvious observation that our society is not yet used to living with publicized open conflicts, because until now they were kept secret and pushed under the surface. Over the years, we have gotten used to a fictitious vision of public life devoid of differing positions and conflicts. This is what makes us different from many European societies where the existence of conflicts is accepted without special emotions. For instance, if the boss of IG Metall, Eugen Loderer, (I am referring to a completely real example) declares "sharp conflict" and forecasts a "declaration of war" in connection with a few percent points of difference between the wage increase demanded by labour unions and that offered by employers, an average citizen of the FRG receives this as routine, commonplace rhetoric because it is known that the dispute will eventually find an institutional, compromise solution. Under our conditions, lacking developed institutional mechanisms, each mention of a difference of positions produces a nervous atmosphere and occasionally is received as a threat to the stability of the state.

Presence of conflict--and this is the new element on the scene of political life in our country--still seems to many people hard to live with; there is a subconscious longing for the times when there was perhaps no freedom of discussion but when the nerves were not exposed to such tests. Hence, the demand for calm and stability appears in the successive OBOP surveys at a very high third place, immediately behind demands for an improved supply situation and for bringing to justice those who abused their positions of authority.

Calm and stability are desired most by 40 percent of citizens. For comparison, the demand for democratization of life, broadening of information and limiting censorship places quite far behind, in eighth place (it is demanded by 15 percent of those polled). It can be assumed that if there were a choice of either stabilization or democratization, stability, even if it was an arbitrarily imposed order, would have a better chance of obtaining society's support even if the price were to be giving up the dreams of a more modern and democratic structure of public affairs. The values of democracy are not obvious for a large sector of the society.

At least until now, there is no conflict in the public consciousness between the desire for changes and the need for stability; these aspirations, even if they are not quite convergent, do not seem in the minds of people to be contradictory, The dominant expectation is that the renewal process can follow a course of changes accompanied by growing stability.

I hope that this diagnosis will continue to be valid in the coming weeks and months. It is quite difficult to foresee the reactions of the society in a little more distant future. What moods will dominate if it is not possible to combine the changes with the society's desire for stability, if the chaos that bothers people so much in their everyday life and at work should continue?

Probably, it would be improper to discard the thought that there may arise a conflict between the aspirations for changes and the desire for order. Observation of similar stormy social changes show that the effect of a prolonged crisis can be just as well the extreme radicalization of feelings (the case of Iran) as the growing tiredness and strengthening of conservative reflexes (the case of Portugal).

I would not be surprised if in the future we were to show nostalgia for some program of the "Recht and Ordnung" kind. Being tired of chaos and uncertainty can create a hard core of people demanding a shortening of reins, an arbitrary pacification of the public mood.

Contrary to circulating myths, Poles have a deeply rooted sense of the reasons of state (the last months have proven this) and are ready to support a strong authority. The trouble is that the concept of "strong authority" does not mean the same thing to everybody. Should its strength be measured by repression? Should it be able to enforce concepts contrary to society's will? Which authority is stronger, that which reserves to itself the broadest possible area or, the opposite, that which avoids getting entangled in details and controls only matters of strategic importance?

These are not simple questions. If we are unable to provide answers that will satisfy common sense and the interest of the state, we can get mired down in a permanent state of confrontation whose outcome will be unknown or we can return to the old rut, unavoidably leading to a new crisis.

If we want to overcome chaos and confusion (I have in mind not so much the political conflicts but rather spontaneous economic processes, uncontrolled bargaining for group interests, watering down of responsibility, etc), it is necessary to start by giving an honest answer to the question: What are the real causes of the drift to chaos in our country. The honest answer does not seem to be provided by the theory whispered in low voices that the whole problem started with the August shock that undermined the authority of the officialdom and diminished its impact on policy. This is a simplified and mystifying interpretation which mistakes effects for causes. Nonetheless, as time goes on, there may be a growing number of people who will detect the cause of chaos in the Polish Summer of 1980.

Let us make it clear: It was not the events in August which caused the erosion of authority but, the contrary, the blowup occurred because for the last few years the impotence of the leadership was increasing. The official vigor and the tightening of the screw, so annoying to the society, should not hide the truth that at the end of 1970's the state was drifting; we practically had no effective policy. The standard of living was decreasing, the country's debt was growing and the dynamics of growth was burned out. Everything was becoming chaotic: the market, the energy industry, the building industry, planning, supplies of materials and cooperation. The authority of government was disappearing--in the summer of 1980 it became evident that the leadership of the state was functioning in a vacuum.

The political significance of the sixth plenary session of the Central Committee consisted primarily of formulating an honest diagnosis of the disease, thus breaking the ingrained tradition of looking for causes in unfavorable general conditions, in drought and floods or in the puzzling "objective circumstances." The report of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee presented by Stanislaw Kania provided an indepth systematic analysis of causes of the setbacks. It is well worth citing certain key theses as they focus attention on the problem the responsibility of the authorities for the crisis situation in which our country finds itself:

--In general terms, the causes of the crisis are rooted in social and economic policy and in management methods.

--There are reasons to believe that the government deserves severe censure for how it has carried out its economic and administrative functions. The understanding of the power of the state was fundamentally false and onesided. Power was not perceived in accordance with Lenin's precept that "the state is powerful through the consciousness of the masses" but, instead, power was seen in assuming and subordinating functions of institutions and organizations by and to the administration.

--It would be a simplification to explain such a profound breach of party principles solely by shortcomings of particular persons. There was no shortage of those but the deciding factors were the wrong approach, improper operation of party and state authorities and the conditions prevailing within these authorities; in short, the deciding factor was the disregard of Leninist norms. The way out must be found in repairing these conditions throughout the system.

Economic errors were the direct cause of the breakdown but under socialism the economy is the product of politics. In a highly centralized model, and this was the model operating in our country for years, economic failures become the defeats of the authority. Thus, the analysis of the crisis must be coupled with an analysis of the errors of central leadership.

First of all, it is necessary to think through the remarkable combination of inertia and simultaneous hyperactivity of the authorities, who at the time of gathering crisis were displaying extraordinary expansiveness. In the second half of 1970's, the authorities required powers almost typical for a state of emergency or, in any event, far exceeding normal prerogatives. In the name of "operative authority," the principle of collegiality was questioned, workers councils were disbanded, labor unions, cooperatives and social organizations were shackled, activities of the Sejm and national councils were reduced to decorative functions, the right of enterprises to make decisions was canceled (in the last period, they had to account for completion of daily tasks, and allocation of spare parts or of a few tons of raw material was decided by a minister, if not by the prime minister personally). In 1979, I personally heard managers of the state energy control board, together with a member of the Political Bureau responsible for this economic area, seriously discuss the possibility of setting up a system which would permit stopping a specific cement furnace in Opole, or a machine tool in Starachowice by pressing a button in

Warsaw; the conclusion of that dream was a melancholy statement: "Unfortunately, science is still lagging behind...."

The root of the defeat is an erroneous concept of maximalization of power. This concept was described in plain words by Kazimierz Barcikowski in his speech at the sixth plenary session of the Central Committee as follows: "This is the product of crossbreeding a corporal's idea of government with a simplistic concept of management in the capitalist countries." While aiming at omnipotence, the difficulties appearing with ever-increasing frequency were interpreted as signals indicating that the reins must be further shortened. This resulted in a vicious circle: the more the screw was tightened, the more circumscribed was the area of independence and self-regulation, the faster grew the chaos, tensions and contradictions. This could not be prevented either by regiments of officials or by streams of directives (whose production grew in the last years to frightening quantities). At the meeting of the Sejm Committee for Legislative Work in November 1980, it was disclosed that in the register of ministerial acts alone, the number of entries grew about 1,000 annually; many acts, perhaps once again this amount, escaped this statistic because some agencies did not submit their directives to be registered (e.g. the Planning Commission and the Office of the Council of Ministers) and because the acts published in the MONITOR POLSKI [the official government gazette] remained outside the register.

The excess of bureaucratic activities created a dangerous illusion that the situation was under control while in reality it was ever more frequently necessary to switch to "manual pilot." Let us cite again K. Barcikowski's speech: "Was it not ridiculous that the prime minister was instructing janitors by radio to weatherstrip doors in freezing winter weather while the basic duties of central authorities were not discharged in even a passable manner?"

The modern state is a too complex organism to use it recklessly for experiments of a neoabsolutist concept. An authority that could not and would not draw reasonable limits to its scope was sentenced in advance to get lost in the forest of fragmentary decisions. He who tries to control everything, controls nothing. We found that out in August when the authorities' room to maneuver ceased to exist and its power fell close to zero.

The authorities free of public opinion's control had the feeling of complete freedom of action, but it was a misleading and dangerous freedom. Spreading corruption and highhandedness among the unwatched officials was not the most important threat. We talk and write about it a lot but we do not pay enough attention to other afflictions to which authorities not obeying the democratic rules of the game are exposed. The price is high: for the doubtful privilege of ignoring public opinion, one pays by becoming dependent on interest groups, industry lobbies, particular factions and cliques. We have seen it in practice: power free of democratic controls was torn to shreds in a chaotic scramble of competing ministerial interests. Under those circumstances no coordinated policy could have been implemented. More powerful ministries were pushing through their investments thus destroying the logic of the plan and voiding any programs which aimed at finding a solution to the impass. It is here that one

must look for the source of anarchy and chaos. I do not think that we can treat this problem today as a problem of the past. The pushing and shoving of the strong and the very strong continue and the risk continues that during clandestine discussions in camera particular interests may prevail at the expense of the public good.

The restrictive and repressive hyperactivity has blocked the mechanisms of social control and criticism. The multiplication of prohibitions and restrictions could not, however, do away with social conflicts which had grown clandestinely under the surface of official life. Restriction of free speech and manipulative propaganda gimmicks created a pacifying image of unanimity and approval. In effect, the authorities were misled by the fiction created by themselves. They did not know what the public really thought. Only complete disorientation can explain the stubborn repetition of the same errors: an example is the repeated overlooking of the society's feelings in the delicate matter of raises and compensation--the society as a whole demanded preferences for those who earned least and the government policy insisted on preferences for the richer ones.

The last error, not a new one either, was the June increase of meat prices which was decided upon without consultations and without recognition of the public mood and which proved to be a suicidal step for the leadership team and dangerous step for the security of the state. Looking back, it can be seen how dangerous it is to disregard arrogantly public opinion. At a certain point, one false step can start an avalanche of unexpected consequences. Could this have been avoided? I believe that in the summer of 1980, it was already too late. There were so many accumulated conflicts that even without that unfortunate decision to increase meat prices, the explosion would have taken place.

The true cause of the stormy events of 1980 was the growing resistance to the anachronistic methods of governing that combined barrack discipline and managerial gimmicks. No authority in the world can function in a social vacuum; encountering mass distrust and resistance, it has no strength left to overcome friction. Instead of carrying out policies which would lead the country to the straight stretch, it has to devote all its effort to survival. As soon as it is assumed that the power of authorities equals their ability to suppress society's resistance, the outcome of that struggle is foreordained.

Mastering the confusion and finding a way out of the crisis depend on creating a climate of trust and on giving a true, not illusory, power to the authorities. Power means ability to conduct effective policies.

The first and the most important condition necessary to overcome the inefficiency and paralysis is to abandon the temptation to go back to the concept of arbitrary imposition of decisions on the society. Dreams about some version of "strongman" power, and there are people who openly advocate such concepts, would be an invitation to enter a blind alley. The cycle, known from the past, must not be repeated: explosion, temporary liberalization, tightening of the screw and return to the old centralist-bureaucratic model. Too much has changed in the country to be able to believe that when the wave of discontent recedes, everything

will go back to the old routine. It is better to look the truth in the face, even if this truth is unpleasant to some. The society, especially the working class, has reached a higher level of public consciousness and there is not a chance that the fictitious, glued together, state of unanimity based on a more or less passive acceptance of orders, could be rebuilt. From now on, all of us must learn to operate in a climate of discussion, differences of opinion and painstaking negotiations. The society and the authorities can reach agreement only in the framework of democratic procedure; impatience will produce nothing, at the most it can result in lengthening the dangerous period of resolving the crisis.

Unfortunately, it is already known today, the process of developing a qualitatively new model of strong authority basing its power not on overconfidence but on trust, will be difficult and probably not free of ups and downs.

It will require much patience and imagination. The society must get rid of the reflex to distance itself from anything that is decided by "them." An obstacle to this can be encountered in the appearing here and there anarchic reactions and even tendencies to create a system of dual authority (this behavior could be interpreted as an expression of irrational protest against conservative recalcitrance of bureaucratic arbitrariness which by rejecting the partnership model of relationships, creates the climate for extremism). But I do not perceive that the main danger lies in anarchic behavior; this is just a fringe. It seems that a more serious problem is the lack of the habit of participating in the governance of the country, this is the unfortunate ballast left behind by the long years of a "managed society." Hipolite Taine was right when he wrote that "man accepts a rule willingly if he contributes to its application. If you want him to be close to the government, let him participate in it. Other ise, being just a spectator, he will see only errors, he will feel only oppression and he will be inclined only to criticize and to hiss." (FRANCE BEFORE THE REVOLUTION published 1881)

On the other hand, among the professional politicians and the functionaries of the power structure, it will not be easy to overcome the stereotype of "operative authority" and "strong hand" and of the distrust of discussion and negotiations as the method to obtain coordinated decision. The mythology of maximalization of power is still going strong: the more power, the better. Hence, there may be a return to the old prejudice against self-government and initiative and the unwillingness to rely on automatic legal and economic mechanisms which remove the need to decide thousands of individual matters. It will take a long time before propositions to draw rational limits to the power of authorities will cease to evoke suspicions of anarchic inclinations.

However, probably these problems are normal for all societies making their first steps on the road to democracy. Quite likely, we will stumble and skin our knees; it is also possible that there will be voices of impatience--some will consider this evolution too fast, others too slow. The thing which we will need most tomorrow and the day after is stubborn persistance and cool judgment. What we have already achieved should convince even the most distrustful skeptics that when our national interest is at stake, emotionalism is discarded. Certainly, we can ourselves develop a model of authority which will fit Polish traditions and political culture. The success can be achieved only by uniting the power of authority with the democratic backing of society.

8801
CSO: 2600

CGT DELEGATION MEETS WITH WALESA IN GDANSK

LD140843 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 8 Jan 81 p 8

[Jacques Dimet dispatch: "CGT Delegation Meets with Lech Walesa and Solidarity Leadership"]

[Text] Gdansk, 7 December--It was a snow-covered Gdansk which welcomed the CGT delegation, but the warmth of the reception it was given made up for the temperatures of 20 degrees below freezing. Indeed, the CGT representatives (Pierre Gensous, Joannes Galland and Gerard Gaume) had talks this morning with Lech Walesa and several other Solidarity leaders. Pierre Gensous invited the Polish trade union to visit France. Lech Walesa accepted the invitation "with enthusiasm."

The first contact at this level between the two biggest trade union organizations in France and Poland took place in an atmosphere of friendship and simplicity. After the meeting Pierre Gensous, flanked by the Confederation's other two national secretaries, answered questions asked by L'HUMANITE and AFP. In particular, he described the talks as "positive." "The aim of our talks," he said, "is to glean as much information as possible about trade union activity and also to determine the conditions for cooperation between Solidarity and the CGT. This initial stage is important. We have invited Solidarity to visit France."

It will be remembered that during his meeting with the CFDT Lech Walesa had already indicated that he hoped to have discussions with all French trade union organizations. "He accepted our invitation with enthusiasm," Pierre Gensous stressed. "We noted," the CGT secretary continued, "convergences between solidarity and us."

"For instance, Lech Walesa indicated that he advocates a self-governing socialist society, and that corresponds to the ideas we have been developing for several years. We also have convergent views on the idea of trade union independence and on the way of viewing inter-trade union relations at the international level."

The CGT delegation arrived at Gdansk very early this morning and was met at the airport by three Solidarity leaders. The talks with Lech Walesa began immediately. Solidarity held a meeting of its national coordinating body today. Pierre Gensous conveyed the CGT's good wishes to it. "We see ourselves in your struggle," the trade union leader stated. "The problems you are facing strike us as extremely important for the French trade union movement. The events in Poland strengthen us in our action for socialist democracy, human rights and the trade union movement's independence from state and parties. In France we have a great deal of information about the

situation in your country and also a great deal of 'misinformation.' Therefore, we decided to come and see for ourselves.

"We are particularly satisfied with this meeting."

The delegation then left the conference hall and went to the Lenin Shipyards to lay a wreath at the memorial erected in memory of the victims of the 1970 events. The delegation had lengthy talks with the shipyard's Solidarity workers' committee. In the afternoon the talks between the CGT delegation and the Solidarity leadership were resumed.

As we announced, the delegation had a meeting yesterday with an expert in trade union problems who explained his ideas on the situation in his country and the ways of remedying it. The three delegates visited the Ursus factory to attend a meeting of the metallurgy trade union's enterprise council and they then met the construction workers' trade union federation secretariat.

On Thursday the delegation will return to Warsaw. It will meet with the "industrial sector trade unions" national coordination leadership before being received in the afternoon by the Polish bishops' secretary Monsignor Dabrowski. At the weekend the French trade unionists will visit Silesia.

CSO: 3100

CGT DELEGATION MEETING WITH TRADE UNIONISTS, BISHOP DABROWSKI NOTED

LD141325 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 10 Jan 81 p 7

[Jacques Dimet dispatch: "CGT Delegation Meets Episcopate Secretary and 'Industrial Sector Trade Unions'"]

[Excerpt] Warsaw, 9 January--The CGT delegation had a meeting this morning with the leadership of the "industrial sector trade unions' coordination body" chaired by Albin Szyszko. The Polish trade unionists explained their viewpoint on the situation in their country and reported on their activities. The two organizations decided to establish cooperation which will take the form, notably, of a regular exchange of information and documents. They called on their federations to establish relations. Finally, the CGT invited an "industrial sector trade unions" delegation to visit France. The invitation was accepted.

The industrial sector trade unions' National Coordination Body, comprising 23 industrial federations and 6 new trade unions with "observer" status, is working for the reform. However, this trade union reform operation is encountering difficulties which the new leader did not conceal. For them, strikes should be the last resort, but they also have a list of demands relating to respecting the agreements reached in the summer, a different way of organizing work, and improved access to the media for the workers.

It is difficult to assess the coordination body's influence. However, this trade union is organized in the textile industry, printing, and allied trades, cultural circles and the construction industry.... The "industrial sector trade union does not have any fundamental difference of opinion with Solidarity on the main demands. It advocates a 40-hour week, self-government based on autonomy for enterprises and giving production workers a bigger share in the committees responsible for drafting the new laws.

Meeting With the Episcopate Secretary

Monsignor Dabrowski, Bishop and Polish Episcopate secretary, received the CGT delegation at the Archbishop's palace yesterday. He welcomed the meeting and explained the Church's opinion on current events. In Monsignor Dabrowski's view, it is essential not to "overdramatize the situation." He thinks that "the current tensions cannot lead to explosions," and he praised the realism shown by the trade union leaderships and the authorities, adding that nobody wants "the country's destabilization." He expressed his support for the current reform process and noted that the foreign

press has, in general, "distorted" the situation, especially by stressing the "tense movements." "The foreign journalists living in Warsaw," he added, "behave much more responsibly and realistically than those who are merely passing through." The Church, the Bishop added, does not regard itself as a political force "but as a spiritual force which wishes to act for the good of the nation."

The meeting between Monsignor Dabrowski and the CGT delegation aroused great interest in Warsaw. The CGT's action in seeking information from all Polish spiritual and social groups is appreciated here.

CSO: 3100

SOLIDARITY LEADERS FROM AROUND COUNTRY GIVE VIEWS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 22 Feb 81 p 13

[Round table talks; see below.]

[Text] Tomorrow, Monday [23 February], a delegation from the free Polish trade union Solidarity will come to Stockholm, invited by the LO [Swedish Federation of Trade Unions]. Great changes have taken place in Poland since the strikes last summer and the formation of Solidarity.

That can be seen, for example, in the Polish press, which has shown a new openness. Thus, for example, late last year the leading political paper POLITYKA published three round table discussions with representatives of Solidarity in Gdansk, Szczecin, and Katowice. Those are discussions that could not have been held, let alone published, 6 months earlier.

DAGENS NYHETER is publishing the round table talks--translated and [illegible]ited by Klas Bergman--as a document from the Poland of the changes. Since they took place the development has continued, ministers have been replaced, and agreements signed.

The three separate round table talks were participated in by Lech Walesa, Andrzej Gwiazda, Bogdan Lis, et al. from Gdansk; Chairman Marian Jurczyk and three other Solidarity members from Szczecin; and Chairman Andrzej Rozplochowski, Secretary Kazimierz Switon, and some other representatives of Solidarity in Slask (Silesia).

On the Communist Party and the Government:

Zielinski: The government has no other obligations than to pay its debt--its debt to society.

Mroczek: What is the state? It is the servant of the nation.

Zielinski: We must present our demands now, after 35 years of more or less submissively waiting for the authorities to pay attention to us, which has created a number of reservations.

Representatives of Solidarity in Gdansk, Szczecin, and Katowice in round table talks published in the newspaper POLITYKA got to say things that well reflect the big changes in Poland these days.

Jurczyk: But the truth was not told, so the people are bitter.

Rozplochowski: People are bitter and their consciousness is so high that they cannot even be bought for money. We demand guarantees of changes. The appeals that we must work are not enough for us. We want specific plans on how our economy will be improved. The proposal of the "little economic reforms" is another example of how the authorities have failed to draw correct conclusions from the present situation, how they are trying to stretch out the time and tire out the public so that patience will be exhausted and people will begin to prey on each other. And so that people will begin to lose faith in Solidarity. But the authorities are wrong; their plan is suicidal, because Solidarity and the people are one and the same.

Switon: Here in Katowice nothing has changed. The ruling group is still the same.

POLITYKA: Don't you believe that this chaos is in the authorities' interest?

Rozplochowski: In part, yes! The authorities prefer a tense atmosphere, full of confrontation.

Cierniewski: What we are after is a climate of honesty.

Switon: We can help, provided the government does not hold us back. To be able to check the flow of demands we must organize, consolidate. We also need access to the mass media. We cannot be treated as the fifth wheel under the wagon.

POLITYKA: Is the situation dangerous for Poland?

Rozplochowski: It is dangerous, and it is the authorities that are responsible for that. There are still many persons in authority that resist the carrying out of correct decisions, even if that results in chaos. Solidarity is supported by the whole people, while these persons in authority are only supported by their own fear of losing their positions.

Cierniewski: We would show if we could that all we want is a better socialism. We want to have communist rule in our country, but a genuine communism.

Walesa: We do not want to overthrow socialism. We are acting quietly, and we should like to help. Socialism is fine. Let it be Poland's way!--- We are not questioning socialism or our alliances. We respect the realities; they cannot be escaped; and as for our sense of responsibility, we have given plenty of evidence of that.

Pienkowska: We demand economic reforms, and they should be worked out by the government in collaboration with the public.

Borusewicz: We know in general that the problems are very great, but we do not know anything specific. I have the impression that nobody wants to talk openly about it.

Pienkowska: In 1970 we believed in renewal. Now we are more experienced and we will not let ourselves be deluded again. For 35 years we have been hearing that the country is being ruled by the working class. If the working class is to run the country it must get specific facts and figures. It is not we that are

responsible for the present crisis. We want to have an authentic debate.

On Solicarity's Rôle and Cooperation With the Old Trade Unions:

Rozplochowski: We have no connections with them. We have so many problems that we do not even think of them.

Cierniewski: The old trade unions are trying to make common cause with Solidarity, to draw benefit from the rights that we have won. When the old trade unions create a program of their own, get a few members, and become an authentic discussion partner in talks with the employers, we will cooperate with them.

Rozplochowski: Today the representatives of the old union come to meetings together with the government's representatives and sit on their side of the table. That tells a good deal about them.

Waliszewski: Of 9,000 workers at our plant, 250 stuck to the old union. Popularity is not to be won with catchwords, but only by actions.

The climate for democracy in Poland is good and we plan to win. Those who muddy the water, start wildcat strikes, threaten those who want to leave the old union. Solidarity was formed in opposition to the old trade unions.

Dlouchy: Let us be frank. Our trade union has come to stay. I hope that news will get to the parts of the country where nobody struck in August and where some people believe that things can remain as they were before.

Mroczek: We are planning to take over the whole trade union movement. A split in the movement makes it weaker, and for that reason I am sorry to see that now that we have won recognition and that unity is in sight, the old trade unions are starting a maneuver, an unfair maneuver, by distributing leaflets in which they say that they will not cooperate with us and by spreading lies.

Jurczyk: From 1971 on, I was chairman of a division of the old trade union at the Warski dockyard. I believe about 80 percent of the people were honest, but there was nothing we could do. We could have put both hands up when we voted and still lost when our chairman was called in to see the party secretary and told how closely he must follow the party's instructions. I was always in the minority. The party members always won.

On Socialism:

Mroczek: I am not a party member, but the idea of a socialist Poland is dear to me. We have all suffered a great deal through distortions of the system. I have not met anybody in our movement that wants to see an end to socialism and the introduction of capitalism.

What do people want? Well, they want to see the party cleaned up, they want to have a genuine socialism that is accompanied by prosperity and justice. Nobody that is opposed to socialism can count on support among the workers.

POLITYKA: With your experience now in political activity, how do you look upon your earlier actions?

Zielinski: I am not opposed to talk about political activity, even though we are often accused of that as if it were a crime and a breach of the signed agreement. If we concern ourselves with people's working conditions and act accordingly, we are engaged in political activity... But we are not an opposition. An opposition is out to get in power, while all we want is to exist, to express our views, and to protect the interests of those who elected us.

Walesa: We are Poles and responsible Poles. We are not trying to govern.

Borusewicz: We have not said that the trade unions would be irresponsible if they did not participate in the government. If the union recognizes the limits it will not be irresponsible. If the union engages in a joint rule, its rôle will come to be the same as the old union's.

Walesa: We know that we are a socialist state and we want to remain one. But we also know that there are many nonsocialist contributions.

Switon: The authorities do not understand that even in the best systems the union stands in opposition to the authorities. It cannot be otherwise, for the authorities do not exist that will give the union everything it demands. But the union must be nonpolitical. Politics is for the authorities.

Johanowicz: We do not want to govern.

Switon: We shall talk about economics, not politics.

POLITYKA: Sometimes it is hard to tell them apart.

Switon: Politics is for the authorities. We shall be a nonpolitical organization, and for that reason I am opposed to Burosewicz's membership in the Gdansk division. He is a political activist. And now I am against Jacek Kuron's (KOR [Committee for the Defense of the Workers]) membership.

POLITYKA: Do people want to have a sociaist system?

Rozplochowski: Yes, indeed, but a real and a just system.

Switon: People do not want to get rid of socialism, but to improve it. They want to have a part in the government and to have organizations that guarantee them their rights. It was either a piece of stupidity or a provocation to make Kuron a member of Solidarity's coordinating committee. We assert that we are a nonpolitical organization and then we appoint a person who has clearly said he is a politician.

POLITYKA: Do antisocialist forces exist?

Jurczyk: Yes, there are such things, but I have not seen them. I did not see them during the strike and I have not seen them since.

Mroczek: I believe those elements are used to scare us with.

Zielinski: The advantages of socialism are widely recognized. If enemies of socialism show up, we shall take them apart in democratic discussion.

On Wages and Solidarity's Rôle at the Factories:

Walesa: Let me propose a system: a factory, let us say, a division is to produce an automobile. For that the work crew gets 2 million zlotys. We say: Make two cars and you will get 2 million zlotys. If that is not possible for reasons that have to do with working together, then just work 4 hours and go fishing afterwards. Let us not pretend to be working, stay out of sight of the foreman. The earlier system called for too many directors, secretaries, overseers, but they cannot be laid off, because we are against lay-offs. But they can do something else, something useful. They can even pat the workers on the cheek if that means that they would then work better. They can fetch material or go shopping for the workers to save time. They take our money in any case, but then the worker would not have to stand in line and could get home earlier to his wife and children.

Borusewicz: The factories should have greater independence. If the director is incompetent he should be replaced... The union opposes unemployment, but not efficient management... The time has come for changes.

Gwiazda: There are exceptions, but most people want to do a good job.

POLITYKA: In your 20 years have you not encountered drunkenness, holding back, false excuses?

Walesa: Why are you surprised? Why should anybody work hard if there was no goal?

Borusewicz: The working class has crammed itself with wage raises on the one hand and liquor on the other.

Gwiazda: There is not even a cultural center for the working class. All that has been scrapped. The only thing that is available is discotheques.

Switon: I think we shall open everything up, from the bottom to the top. Then everybody could judge how much each one can afford. They say salaries in the party are low, and yet there are many party bosses that live like kings.

Rozplochowski: First of all we should determine what the minimum wage shall be, and then how much higher the highest wage shall be, as they do in Sweden.

Cierniewski: We consider that everybody should get wage raises in view of the increased cost of living, but wage raises either for everybody or principally for those who make the least--absolutely not the opposite.

Rozplochowski: We want to have a uniform wage system so that the most powerful do not get all they want and leave nothing for the great majority... Let us establish an equitable wage scale with special bonuses for dangerous work, and let us change the central negotiations procedure.

Mroczek: The new union will be more active in the management of the factory, but that will not express itself in exhortations to work harder and put in more overtime. People cannot be forced to work harder. Instead, the union will keep an eye on supplies of raw material and tools and the organization of the work. Higher production can be attained that way.

Dlouchy: People struck for this trade union, fought for it, and believe in it. If they see that the independent trade union is the administration's partner and see that their work is not in vain, they will work well.

Mroczek: We shall not be able to omit saying something to a person that works poorly. We shall tell him openly what we think.

Zielinski: We shall not hesitate to say this to a poor worker or to a poor director or minister.

Murczyk: We used to be punished for that or kicked out of our jobs.

POLITYKA: Are you not afraid the worker that is criticized will cease to care for you?

Zielinski: If he sees that we use the same language in criticizing him as in criticizing a minister, he will not turn his back on us.

Mroczek: What about unemployment? If we want to assure ourselves of efficiency, we must give the directors the right to fire people, whether we like it or not.

Dlouchy: But then we need honest directors of enterprises.

Jurczyk: We shall share the responsibility for both reverses and gains.

On the Danger of a Soviet Intervention:

Rozplochowski: There is nothing for our allies to be disturbed about. We are straightening out the problems in our own sovereign country... We do not want to create disorder, but neither do we want to abandon the work we have started.

On the Future:

Mroczek: We must be optimists. We must hang together and survive this hard winter. We must understand that regardless of our sympathies, we need each other.

Zielinski: Words do not suffice. The authorities must show something, even if only a little, besides good will. They must create conditions under which work is not thrown away.

Jurczyk: Even if only by small steps, we must go forward, without dynamic developments, but steadily forward.

8815
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SOVIET CUSTOMS OFFICIALS INCREASE HARASSMENT OF TRAVELERS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 16 Feb 81 p 13

[Report by DAGENS NYHETER correspondent Staffan Teste]

[Text] Brest, Sunday [15 February]--The psychological warfare that the Soviet Union is now conducting against Poland is perhaps most strongly marked for individual Poles at the Soviet border stations on the Polish border a few kilometers from the Soviet city of Brest (Brest-Litovsk) in Byelorussia.

Polish groups pass through here continually on the way to the Soviet Union, but individual Polish visitors to the Soviet Union are becoming more and more rare. At the Soviet border station the Poles are compelled to sit for hours, and when they are at last checked they are compelled to unpack everything they bought in the Soviet Union.

When I myself was passing through customs with my car on the way to Warsaw, a Soviet customs official went through clothing that a Polish truck driver had bought, with spiteful comments about the purchases having been made for speculation.

During the time I was there a Polish tourist group of 38 persons had to leave their bus and carry all their baggage from the bus into the customs building. An hour and a half later, when I myself had had my baggage gone through, the Poles were still patiently waiting among teddybears, children's bicycles, dolls, and other playthings that they had bought at the department store in Brest.

When in good time I got my own pass I saw that the customs personnel had started tearing open every possession of some of the 38 Polish tourists'--a procedure that must have taken a good long time in itself.

Recently the Polish authorities have presented official protests to the GDR and Czechoslovakia about how Poles are treated at those two countries' border stations. They have not ventured to make any protest to the Soviet Union, in spite of similar harassment at the Polish-Soviet borders.

The harassment of Poles is taking place at the same time that Soviet tourists on the way home cross the Polish border without even having to leave their buses. They only send in a Soviet guide and the driver to report the crossing.

But the hardest hit are the Poles that are on their way into the Soviet Union. Poles report that then all books and newspapers are confiscated. They have to put up with their lapels being examined to make sure the badge of the independent Polish trade union Solidarity is not pinned there. The Soviet Union appears to be in mortal fear of Polish "infection" right now, and the customs station at Brest evidently has strict orders not to let any material from Solidarity get in across the Soviet border.

It no longer helps to be a correspondent in the Soviet Union and to have the right under the Helsinki Agreement of 1975 to carry material with you for your work in the Soviet Union. I experienced that myself on the way back from a visit in Poland when the Soviet customs confiscated, among other things, newspapers published by Solidarity.

They also showed the "kindness" not to pay back my rubles that I had left in their keeping on the way out. The safe was locked, I was told.

8815
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SWEDEN TO INCREASE EXPORT GUARANTEE AID

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 14 Feb 81 p 30

[Text] The Swedish government has adopted a decision in principle to extend quick economic aid to Poland. Between 200 million and 250 million kronor is being made available, according to DAGENS NYHETER's information, for payments for Swedish exports to Poland.

The government's decision is in answer to a request for economic aid that Poland sent to Sweden and a number of other West European countries last fall.

"I can confirm that the government has adopted a decision in principle on the question, but the size of the economic aid and the details are still being worked out," Ulf Dinkelsp.el, secretary of state of the Ministry of Trade, tells DAGENS NYHETER.

Besides the guarantee amounting to 200 million or 250 million kronor, Sweden will also extend a loan to Poland to help with "refinancing." Poland will thus be able to borrow a still undetermined amount from Sweden to be used to cover payments on export credits extended previously.

"The aim of this aid to Poland is partly to keep Swedish firms' business with Poland going, but also in a more general way to assist a country that has serious economic problems," says Ulf Dinkelspiel.

Technically the aid will be handled by the government's letting the so-called Export Credit Board guarantee payments for future Swedish exports to Poland in the amount of 200 million to 250 million kronor. These may be exports of products of the engineering industry, pulp, iron ore, but also more shortlived goods, such as foodstuffs.

Similar aid measures are being taken in several West European countries. On the Swedish side, however, it is emphasized that there is no question of any common, joint action.

Poland is one of the world's most debt-ridden countries. According to certain reports the foreign debt amounts to over $23 billion. Close to 90 percent of Poland's export income, even before the disturbances and strikes, was being used to pay interest and amortization payments on foreign loans.

Sweden's claims against Poland amount to about 1.7 billion kronor.

"We must pay back two thirds of our foreign debts of $23 billion during the next 3 years," Zbigniew Karsz told the news agency AP-DJ [expansion unknown] in Warsaw.

According to AP-DJ, in government circles there is a cautious faith in Poland's chances of avoiding a massive financial crisis through new credits from the West.

But during 1981 alone an extra $9 billion was needed to cover current payments for goods and for debt service.

The Poles, according to AP-DJ, are careful to emphasize that the country will not have any general debt moratorium, since that might endanger the possibilities of getting loans in the future.

8815
CSO: 3109

JOURNALIST ORGANIZATION'S FIKUS DISCUSSES CONGRESS, REFORMS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Feb 81 p 8

[Report of interview with Dariusz Fikus by Michael Winiarski, of the newspaper ARBETSMILJÖ]

> [Text] At a stormy special congress of the Polish journalists' organization last fall a new management was elected and the statutes were revised. A new censorship law was demanded and the right of the mass media to print differing views was asserted. Michael Winiarski has talked with Dariusz Fikus, the new secretary general, about the liberalization process.

The usually heavy Warsaw air had become easy to breathe this winter. There is finally something in the newspapers for the information-thirsty Poles to read. Articles and reportage that were previously blocked can now be published. Certainly censorship has not disappeared, but the limits of freedom have been extended. At the same time the Polish journalists have livened up after decades of torpor.

One of the institutions exposed to the hardest attacks by the striking workers in the fall was the Polish press. One of the main demands was that the papers must stop keeping silent and instead talk about what was really happening.

The papers' credibility was at rock bottom. Few read them, and there were not many that believed even the news that was really true.

Special Congress

Under the pressure of newly freed opinion, many journalists began questioning and analyzing their rôle in the prevailing information system themselves. A critical movement arose, and finally the board of the Polish journalists' organization found themselves compelled to call a special congress.

The congress, which was held in November, was a stormy affair. The situation arose--unique under Polish conditions--that the incumbant board did not get political freedom to answer, and then a completely new leadership of the organization was chosen. Dariusz Fikus, editorial secretary of the distinguished weekly POLITYKA, was elected secretary general. It was a logical choice, since POLITYKA had functioned all through the years as an oasis of respectability. In the dark

year of 1968 POLITYKA almost alone stood firm and did not allow itself to be drawn into the anti-Semitic campaign.

The journalists' congress discussed the political and economic causes of the Polish crisis in detail. In one resolution the delegates self-critically stated that one of the decisive factors in the crisis was precisely the way the mass media were functioning.

"None of us," says Dariusz Fikus, "was entirely without blame for the 'progress propaganda,' which rested on the notion that the more we emphasize our advances, the better it will be in the country. At the same time that the situation was really getting worse, we were boasting more and more in the mass media."

Information

The statutes of the journalists' organization were revised so that one objective will now be to provide objective, comprehensive information to the citizens. This will be achieved in part by the press's guaranteeing access of authorities and enterprises to all available information--with the exception of state secrets, etc.--and the right to express different opinions.

"We shall note every case in which western news media report events in Poland before we do. These cases will then be subjects for review by special committees. The aim is for our mass media to report as fully, quickly, and competently as possible. That is important, especially so that the country's leaders can really find out what is happening. Paradoxically enough, our party and state leaders in general have not read Polish papers in recent years, because they knew in advance what would be in them. They could content themselves with reading the news agency PAP's special internal bulletins or other confidential material."

"How could it come about that the press allowed itself to be so compromised?"

"The problem .s rooted in the view of information that prevailed in East Europe in the postwar period," says Dariusz Fikus. "In a situation in which Europe was divided into two hostile camps, information was synonymous with propaganda. A socialist society was to be constructed in spite of the fact that the communists made up a minority of the population. The party felt constantly threatened, either by western reaction or by domestic enemies, and that naturally had an effect on the way the mass media functioned.

"The party can conduct its propaganda, of course, and try to mold public opinion, but that will not be done by censorship and intervention in the regular work of the editorial staffs."

Censorship

The question of censorship was one of the hottest subjects of debate at the journalists' congress. In the agreement concluded in August between the strike committees and the government it was stated that before the end of 1980 a new censorship bill would be introduced in the Sejm (parliament). But the question has been postponed and so far no bill has been presented.

The journalists' congress declared that a censorship law must specify exactly what can be censored and what cannot. The control authorities shall justify each

intervention in writing, and there must be an opportunity to appeal a censorship decision. Moreover, the new censorship authority must be responsible to the Sejm, and not to the government, as is the case at present.

"Ultimately, it will still be the practice that is decisive. In the past, the practice has been that literally everything could be subjected to censorship. Interventions did not primarily concern state secrets or security matters, but often capriciously chosen subjects, sometimes mere trifles.

The Opposition

"The censorship policy has changed. After the big crises, especially in 1956 and 1970, the climate was more open and one could write a little more, but soon everything returned to the old status. But part of the picture is the emergence of an organized opposition during the latter part of the 1970's. Books and newspapers began to be published out of reach of the censorship, and that was an entirely new phenomenon in an East European country."

After August 1980 the censorship acted more cautiously, and for a short period in the fall there were no interventions at all. But recently Dariusz Fikus feels he has observed an activation of the control apparatus.

"The authorities have recovered and are trying to gain back lost ground. But at the same time Solidarity is increasing in strength and becoming a sort of competitor to the authorities. In the situation in which these two forces are on a collision course, our organization should play a mediating rôle and contribute to increased understanding."

Particularly in two matters in which the new union is in confrontation with the state authorities, censorship has been practically airtight. These are the fight over free Saturdays and the extent to which the farmers shall be allowed to organize the Agricultural Solidarity. Recently, during a visit in Szczecin, Dariusz Fikus was a witness to how the censorship can act:

"The Solidarity branch there had a meeting at which, among other things, a resolution was adopted that demanded the establishment of a 5-day week. The next day the party newspaper published a much-censored report of the meeting; the demand for Saturdays off was not mentioned. When it was time to produce the evening paper the lithographers declared that they did not plan to print the paper unless the whole article about the union meeting was put in. The censorship authorities yielded in the face of that, and the article was allowed to come out in its entirety."

I asked Dariusz Fikus whether a different model would be conceivable; perhaps a system like that in Sweden, where one is called to account afterwards for publicity that is defamatory or dangerous to the national security.

"No, not if I am to be really honest about it. Censorship is necessary in this political system. But a new censorship law should set definite limits for the censorship. With the aid of censorship it is possible today to conduct politics behind the scenes. The party should use the method of persuasion instead. It must learn to win a majority by arguing. Maybe it has arguments! On the Saturday question, for example, I think the party is undoubtedly right. We cannot afford to shorten hours radically when we are producing so little now. But the

matter has been deplorably handled. The conflict is really entirely unnecessary."

At the same time that the authorities must accustom themselves to the new situation, the journalistic world must also learn to work under the new conditions. Dariusz Fikus fears that the pressures on the mass media to lie low and not touch upon sensitive questions will increase in the future. Still, he is optimistic:

"With stronger editorial staffs, better editors in chief, and more thinking journalists we can defend ourselves more easily. The function of the journalists' organization will then be to give the journalists moral support."

8815
CSO: 3109

'ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI' ON KURON'S VISION OF POLISH FUTURE

AU211907 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 15-16 Nov 80 p 3

[Jan Lew article: "From the File of a Programmer"]

[Excerpts] The leaders of the new trade unions, with the Independent, Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity at the head, are openly for socialism in its correct ideological and political meaning. Such an attitude is certainly no less than constructive and is generally supported. However, the staff of an opposition organization called KSS/KOR [The Social Self-Defense Committee--Workers Defense Committee] still seems to be of a different frame of mind. We have been able to get to know that organization through some of its earlier enunciations, which are so readily made public in order to meet the urgent needs of the antisocialist propaganda centers abroad. One such enunciation is that the Polish apparatus of power should be "dismantled" as soon as possible, but since it cannot be done all at once, "stages" should be resorted to.

What kind of role have the trade unions to play in that little honorable task? The problem is simple: They will be used as a means to take over power by the people who are so keen on power that, at times, they get out of breath. In that way the country's socialist renewal, which was initiated and is being implemented by the Polish workers' class, would in fact turn this class into a digger of its own grave.

There is no exaggeration in those gloomy prospects. It is enough to give thought to the social and material conditions of the Polish workers under the system that the politicians, who have no doubt completely lost their sense of responsibility for Poland, would like to impose on us, not without support from abroad. In the concept of those politics, the workers and, of course, all the people amount to no more than just tools.

A program for the future. That is what one should exlaim on having read a new statement by Mr Jacek Kuron, who is the KOR group's ideologue and practitioner. For purely technical reasons I inform you that he published his statement in a KOR bulletin in Poland. But since this was obviously not enough, it was also published by a certain little Polish daily in London [DZIENNIK POLSKI I DZIENNIK ZOLNIERZA].

His statement is entitled "What Next?" At this point I have to make an observation, unlike his recent "Open Letter to the Coastal Workers," the statement "What Next?" is written in entangled language and is full of dead platitudes. It is written in a style that is so readily ridiculed by various columnists.

Mr. Kuron's most important wish is to have the independent trade unions and other self-governing social and professional organizations--all "movements," as people say--exert a destructive influence on the apparatus of state power. He says: "Every movement I have mentioned--I have not mentioned all of them--seeks in its activities to radically curb the sphere of central power. That is why each such movement helps intensify the disintegration of the central management system and, consequently, of its apparatu.."

There is no vacuum. As it turns out, Mr Kuron is not the one not to include in his visions the possibility for Soviet intervention in Poland, should his planned escalation of "dismantling" reach a certain stage. And here again the murder is coming out: "We have embarked upon the road of no return. I think that today the USSR will agree to the aforementioned grassroots democratization of Poland so as not to be forced to resort to armed intervention. Tomorrow it may agree to further progress in that democratization in exchange for guarantees for its military interests. The day after tomorrow... We can dispense with prognostications." The author of the statement stops in his tracks. After a brief reflection I decided to continue--on behalf of Mr Kuron--prognostications as to what would happen after the "day after tomorrow." Everything is so clear that you do not have to especially strain your imagination. "The day after tomorrow," that is, following the "dismantling" of the Polish state, there also would follow the Soviet Union's resignation of its "military interests" in Poland. A direct result of which would be the arrival of the Bundeswehr at the Soviet border.

I hope Mr Kuron will forgive me that I am doing, perhaps too rashly, his job as regards prognostications, but the present-day world seems very allergic to political and military vacuums. I can imagine the situation in which Mr Kuron would agree. Unconcernedly, to the entry into Poland of the main armed element of NATO with all the ballast of the traditions of the teutonic knights and the Wehrmacht--I can imagine such a situation all the more effortlessly since Mr Kuron is already in favor of a Polish border with a "united Germany," that is, a Germany that would be established after the GDR has been liquidated. Such a "united Germany" would be some ally!

I do not question that Mr Kuron, considering his ill-concealed megalomania, dreams about exerting some kinds of pressure on the USSR. Let that remain his personal problem. As for me, I want to ask him whether he has any idea at all what the raison d'etat means. It seems to me that it is impossible to ask him to opt for Polish-Soviet friendship, which is the bulwark of our national existence, so I will say that Poland's and the USSR's interests are identical in every sphere, including the military sphere, because they cannot be otherwise.

That is precisely the road of no return because this road is of decisive importance for our country's future and for its peaceful life, security, and independence.

If Mr Kuron does not know the meaning of imperialist militarism in its most aggressive and destructive form because he did not go through what millions and millions of our people had to go through, then at least he should read something on the subject. Of course, it would be better if those of his colleagues who have not lost their commensense gave him some relevant lessons.

CSO: 2600

BRIEFS

PRINTERS TRAIN WITH STOCKHOLM NEWSPAPER--Monday Morning [16 February] three printers from Solidarity in Gdansk began 4 weeks' training in Sweden at DAGENS NYHETER's reproduction and printing school. They are guests of the printers' union, and after the first week at DAGENS NYHETER the group from Poland will go on to other concerns. The start on Monday morning was a reminder of Poland's problems. Two others should have been in the group, but one was stopped by the authorities and the other may perhaps come later. The three who actually came are photographer Tadeusz Kijewski, printer Tomasz Wojdakowski, and copyist-mechanic Jan Ogorek. Malgorzata Socha is accompanying them as interpreter. She is studying Scandinavian languages and speaks good Swedish, but is having a hard time with all the printing technical terms. Solidarity in Gdansk now has its own printing equipment, and recently there were 2 shipments from Norway of 12 offset machines, 4 stencil machines, and a batch of paper. The money was raised in a campaign with the slogan "An hour's pay for Poland." [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 19 Feb 81 p 10] 8815

CSO: 3109

REPUBLICS' AGREEMENT ON ARMY DEVELOPMENT, DEFENSE GOALS, 1981-85

Belgrade SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ in Serbo-Croatian No 74, 31 Dec 80 pp 2247-2253

[Agreement among the Federal Executive Council, the executive councils of the republics and the executive councils of the autonomous provinces signed 18 December 1980 in Belgrade by their respective representatives]

[Text] On the basis of Articles 102, 106, 108 and 109 of the Law on the Bases of the System of Social Planning and on the Social Plan of Yugoslavia (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, No 6, 1976), the Federal Executive Council, the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR [Socialist Republic] Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Montenegro, the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Croatia, the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Macedonia, the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Slovenia, the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Serbia, the Executive Council of the Assembly of SAP [Socialist Autonomous Province] Kosovo and the Executive Council of the Assembly of SAP Vojvodina hereby conclude the following

AGREEMENT
On the Bases of the Social Plan of Yugoslavia Covering the Period From 1981 to 1985 Concerning Development of the Yugoslav People's Army and Establishment of Other Common Interests and Goals in the Domain of the Country's National Defense and Security

Article 1

Common interests and goals in creating the material and other conditions for accomplishment and development of nationwide defense and social self-protection which are to be achieved from 1981 to 1985 are hereby set forth in this agreement.

Article 2

Taking as their points of departure the level attained in development of the country and of its defense and protection, the contradictions in international relations, the necessity to preserve independence, and the further development of Yugoslav socialist self-managed society, and in order to strengthen nationwide defense and social self-protection as an integral part of overall social development, the parties to this agreement have agreed that in this agreement they shall

set forth the common interests and goals in development of the Yugoslav People's Army and other components of nationwide defense and social self-protection from 1981 to 1985, the material conditions and other conditions, as well as the tasks, measures and activities to accomplish the agreed development, and that within their respective jurisdictions they shall urge self-managed organizations and communities and sociopolitical communities to organize and prepare nationwide defense and social self-protection as a unified and lasting self-management function in accordance with their respective material capabilities.

Article 3

The basic common interests and goals in development of the country's national defense and security are as follows:

1) strengthening the country's overall development, which ensures stronger defense and protection of freedoms, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;

2) developing the socioeconomic relations of socialist self-management, which ensure that the working people and citizens shall directly and through the delegate system make decisions on all questions of nationwide defense and social self-protection;

3) developing further all the components of the system of nationwide defense and social self-protection;

4) preparing measures, ensuring the conditions and equipping agencies and organizations in sociopolitical communities for effective functioning of the social system in wartime;

5) equipping economic and social activities for rapid conversion to operation and functioning under all conditions and forms of aggression and, in particular, equipping the working people and citizens--persons subject to labor conscription--to perform jobs and work tasks in wartime.

Article 4

The parties to this agreement have agreed to the continuance of further improvement of the organization, to the modernization of personnel and equipment, and to the enhancement of the combat capability and in particular the firepower of wartime and peacetime units of the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. To that end the following should be assured:

1) further updating of the branches and arms and of combat systems for antiair, antiarmor and antilanding combat through development and modernization of the Yugoslav People's Army and a still greater bolstering of the Yugoslav People's Army to meet the demands of present-day warfare;

2) continuation of the technical modernization of the Yugoslav People's Army, based primarily on R&D and manufacturing capabilities within the country and on their modernization, and also, along with respect for the needs of national de-

defense and in conformity with the relevant criteria, granting priority to construction of facilities in those republics and autonomous provinces in which special-purpose manufacturing has not sufficiently developed up to now;

3) intensification of work on developing, putting into production and faster achievement of production of armament and military equipment and also on improvement of the technology relevant to other materials to meet the needs of that production;

4) improvement of training and military schools in accordance with the organizational and technical modernization of the armed forces and bringing them into conformity with development of the school system as a whole;

5) still greater reliance of the system of rear support, especially to meet noncombat needs, on manufacturing and service facilities of society which will be used in a possible war.

Article 5

The parties to this agreement have agreed that between 1981 and 1985 they will provide in the federal budget permanent and stable funds to finance the Yugoslav People's Army in the proportion of 5.80 percent of the actual national income of Yugoslavia in current prices.

Article 6

The parties to this agreement shall take steps so that territorial defense continues to develop on a uniform foundation and in conformity with uniform criteria issued by the commander in chief of the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, so that they are a strong and massive component of the unified armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the broadest nationwide (opcenarodni) form of society's organization and preparation for armed combat and other forms of resistance to an aggressor, as well as an organized force for social self-protection, especially in order to protect facilities and areas which have particular importance, provision being made for its reliance on sociopolitical and public organizations and for it to be a mass school for preparing all the working people and able-bodied citizens for all forms of combat and resistance to the enemy. The following are necessary to this end:

1) emphasis in development of territorial defense should be on further enlargement and strengthening of tactical units in accordance with the needs and capabilities of local communities, organizations of associated labor and opstinas;

2) the combat capability of combined territorial defense units should be strengthened first, and in accordance with the overall strengthening of the country's armed forces they should be equipped with more appropriate armament;

3) the equipping of territorial defense units with up-to-date combat materiel should be continued, especially armament for antiarmor combat, antiair defense, landing and antilanding actions and the means of providing fire support, above all from domestic production;

4) more massive involvement of young people and women in territorial defense;

5) intensification of R&D work to put into production the relevant armanent and military equipment specific to the needs of territorial defense, in collaboration with the Federal Secretariat for National Defense;

6) enhancement of the operating efficiency of staffs and commands, enabling them in particular to operate on territory captured temporarily by the enemy, through improvement of military organization, by furnishing up-to-date equipment for communication and command, and by improving training.

Article 7

In view of the importance of protecting and rescuing the population and material, cultural and other values and property from warfare and natural and other disasters it is indispensable in the period from 1981 to 1985 to ensure through more intensive preparations greater competence on the part of civil defense in the country's self-managed mechanism of defense and protection, so that civil defense, thanks to its large-scale and organized activity, strengthens still more nationwide defense and social self-protection and by virtue of its content augments their resistance and quality.

The parties to this agreement have agreed that emphasis in development of civil defense shall be on further large-scale preparation of the population for personal and joint protection and on preparing and performing the measures of protection and rescue. Priority in this shall be given to shelters, firefighting, emergency medical aid, radiological, biological and chemical protection, rescue from ruins, training, material and technical supply with reliance on domestic manufacturing, and improvement of the competence of civil defense units and staffs, with particular reference to the specific nature and extent of the threat to large cities and industrial centers. Particular attention shall be paid to building shelters and equipping existing structures to serve as shelters.

Article 8

The parties to this agreement have agreed that the service for observation, reporting, notification and warning shall be further developed and enabled so that it can detect in good time all types of threats and furnish notification and warning concerning the threats discovered for the sake of timely preparation and activation of forces for defense and protection, and also that the necessary number of visual observations shall be established in every sizable settlement, first of all in the zone near the border.

The parties to this agreement have agreed on assurance in peacetime of the necessary scale of organization and functioning of the service for observation, reporting, notification and warning to meet the needs of sociopolitical communities in emergencies.

Emphasis in development of the service for observation, reporting, notification and warning should be on the following: enlistment of specialists and training of

peacetime and wartime staffs, equipping of centers for notification and warning and the observer network, bringing its development and equipment into conformity with the development and equipping of observation services in the armed forces, mutual linkage of centers for notification and warning from the opstina to the Federation and the linking of those centers to the centers of military services for observation and notification as well as with all sources of information, including the general public. Particular attention shall be paid to equipping those organizations and services which as part of their regular activity are engaged in observing particular phenomena so that they can operate in case of natural disasters and other emergency situations.

Article 9

The parties to this agreement have agreed that they shall take steps to augment the capacities of radio, radio-relay, telegraph and telephone communications as a whole, especially communications for [military] direction in lower-level sociopolitical communities; to complete construction of the radio-relay system and to speed up work on construction of the system of the cable network; to resolve more rapidly the problems of standardization and typification of communication equipment and their linkage into a unified communication system, that is, linkage of functional communication systems to on another, and the supply of communications security equipment, and in particular that the communications security system shall be improved to guarantee effective and secure functioning of communications under all conditions.

Development of the communications system should provide the leadership of sociopolitical communities, services for observation, reporting, notification and warning, and civil defense uninterrupted functioning of communications of more than one kind and over more than one channel.

Article 10

Because of the great importance of developing economic and social-service activities to the further strengthening of defense and protection, the parties to this agreement have agreed that they shall urge that plans for development of economic and social-service activities covering the period from 1981 to 1985 make provision for greater alignment of their respective socioeconomic development with the needs for development of nationwide defense and social self-protection.

Plans of self-managed organizations and communities and sociopolitical communities, and also development programs in economic and social-service activities should through coordination and implementation of development policy create conditions for intensification of the production of raw materials, energy and food relying on domestic sources and should ensure that this production be at least equal to the demand in emergency situations and in wartime, that an efficient and better-rounded structure of production and services be achieved in individual regions, and that overall development, especially that of the manufacturing industry, be based more and more on domestic scientific-technical, raw material and manufacturing potential so as to diminish foreign dependence in this way, ensuring at the same time the most optimum consumption.

In view of what has been stated and mindful of the specific issues which need to be resolved in connection with maximum effectiveness in the functioning of economic and social-service activities in wartime, the parties to this agreement have agreed as follows:

1) to augment the functional capability of the fuel and power system under all conditions, including wartime conditions, inter alia by building small facilities (small hydroplants, small coal mines, etc.) and reserve units, combined with more favorable location and better mutual linkup and greater resistance and protection of all facilities of the fuel and power system. Particular attention shall be paid to substitution of domestic energy for imported energy, and accordingly to the following:

a. to greater utilization of hydropower, especially that of run-of-river and small storage plants, to maintenance and conservation of existing local hydroplants and steam plants, to the assurance of small-capacity mobile sources of electric power, to uranium exploration and exploitation, to the use of wind energy, solar energy, geothermal energy, and biomass, and also to the production of electric power from chemical sources and to the mastery of new devices and new raw materials for the production of energy;

b. to the development of appropriate technology and capacities for the production of dehydrated coal, briquettes, coke, semicoke, low-temperature coke (svelni koks), mold coke (form-koks), etc., from domestic grades of coal, to maintenance of the production of underground mines whose production is not economical in peacetime by granting tax exemptions and the like, to obtaining synthetic gas and liquid fuels from coal, to better utilization of coal, wood mass and solid combustible waste along with the mastery of more economical furnace equipment;

c. to intensification of petroleum and gas exploration in all areas of the country, to obtaining various liquid fuels from coal and bituminous shale, to greater use of alcohol, to preparation of capabilities for considerably greater pumping of crude petroleum and gas from existing pools, to creation of reserves of petroleum, petroleum derivatives and additives, and also to studying possibilities for using exhausted ore deposits for storage of petroleum, gas and other articles;

d. to mixing natural and synthetic gas in general and especially within the gas pipeline system;

2) to develop more rapidly the production of raw materials and other manufacturing materials and also the collection of secondary raw materials and scrap, above all those which are being imported and which can be obtained efficiently within the country, provided that at least those amounts indispensable for production in wartime are prepared, and accordingly:

a. organization of the production of steels resistant to high temperatures and steels with special properties for special purposes, except those steels whose consumption is small and which therefore should be imported and provided for in reserves; provision for more efficient collection of steel scrap with a view to collection under wartime conditions when the amounts of this scrap and the need

for their utilization increase; provision for organization of the production of prereduced pellets as a substitute for steel scrap; work on substitution of appropriate selections of domestic ore for refining-grade iron ore; organization of the production of certain ferroalloys and development of capacities for the production of iron ores, nonferrous metals (lead, zinc, bauxite, etc.) in line with subsequent phases of manufacturing;

b. work to master products in the field of carbochemistry (benzene, toluol, xylol, phenol, naphthalene, antracene, and so on); mastery of the process for obtaining ammonium sulfate from gypsum and ammonia, the process of parallel production of cement and sulfuric acid from gypsum, clay, quartz and cinder pyrites, the process of obtaining sulfur from petroleum, natural gas and coal, and the manufacture of phosphoric acid and phosphate fertilizers; use of waste from agriculture and the food manufacturing industry and the processes of fermentation to obtain alternatives for carbohydrates from starchy substances; more intensive use of the waste of the chemical industry;

c. particularly intensive work to master production of pharmaceutical raw materials and finished drugs from domestic raw materials; construction of optimum new plants at safer locations, and partially to develop and make provision for semi-industrial procedures for the production of raw materials and drugs which are not now manufactured in the co. ..y and procedures with simplified technology for existing production operations, as well as the mothballing of plants being written off which may be important for defense in wartime;

d. payment of particular attention to substitutions of raw materials and manufacturing materials for the production of clothing, footwear and corresponding parts of military equipment, and also substitutes of rubber products, related work to improve the characteristics and expand the sphere of application of domestic wool, hemp, flax, silk, hides, furs, etc., as well as on substitution of natural raw materials by artificial fibers based on cellulose, on man-made fibers thanks to provision for larger production of monomers and other forms of pellets within the country, on regenerated textile fibers, artificial leather and fur, etc.; provision for substitutes of chemical products in short supply (pigments and other agents used in manufacturing and finishing) and of other auxiliary materials and accessories, still further simplification of technical processes and use of available equipment and preparation of the relevant manufacturing instructions for production of clothing, footwear, etc., in just a few of the principal sizes;

3) payment of greater attention to development of the agroindustrial complex, specifically by organizing the production of agricultural products and food on all available land, by increasing the livestock population, especially horses, and by building up inventories and reserves of foodstuffs in areas of wartime consumption, to be encouraged by appropriate economic policy measures, so as to equip the country for meeting the needs of the public and the armed forces in wartime, and especially by developing the hilly and mountain regions and by creating meat reserves in the form of livestock; in this connection payment of particular attention to cropping and livestock production in accordance with the climatic and other conditions of the various regions, to the building of economically viable manufacturing plants using raw materials from their own areas and other areas, and

also to the further exploration and development of sources of drinking water. Particular attention shall be paid to protection against floods, ice, pollution, diseases and pests of plants and livestock, and to the storage of raw and processed foods, etc., with particular consideration to environmental protection and land use planning;

4) assurance of development of the transportation infrastructure and transportation equipment as much as possible in conformity with the needs to develop the country's defense and protection, which is to be achieved above all thanks to greater reliability of the transportation system under varying conditions, more uniform geographic location of the various branches of transportation, higher traffic capacity of transportation junctions, construction and equipping of reserve transportation routes and loading and unloading points, and maximum typification and standardization of transportation equipment.

The parties to this agreement are also agreed that they shall plan activities and take steps to create more favorable conditions for faster development of small business, above all to development of small-scale manufacturing, repair and other service facilities, the cottage industry, and so on, and it is especially important to develop such facilities in those regions where economic activities have been underdeveloped and in which migrational movements are more pronounced.

Components of defense and protection must be incorporated into urban land use plans and into their administration, above all through more uniform location and development of cities and settlements, manufacturing and service facilities, components of the infrastructure, etc.

The parties to this agreement have agreed to take specific steps to strengthen preparations of economic and social-service activities for operation in wartime and on behalf of that purpose to achieve the necessary mutual linkage among those activities and also the appropriate cooperation among interested social and public entities. As part of those preparations they shall ensure substitution of imported products and raw materials by domestic ones, the training of citizens subject to labor conscription, the preparation, safekeeping and protection of engineering and technological documentation, and also the preparation of the placement parts, tools and additional machinery for production and the rendering of services under wartime conditions; the drafting of plans for preparation of wartime sites and preparation of grounds and structures for removal and also for the permanent operation of certain facilities on territory occupied temporarily.

Article 11

As part of attainment of higher effectiveness in preparations of social-service activities for defense and resistance the parties to this agreement shall take steps aimed at the following:

1. assurance of the process of ongoing continuing training, but also the process of incorporating material relevant to nationwide defense and social self-protection into all instruction in schools and educational institutions at all levels of education for the sake of greater coverage and preparation of the population,

young men and women in particular, so as to make them fit to carry out missions of defense and protection with respect to their political ideology, professional competence, military training and physical preparedness; drafting of curricula and syllabi for use in wartime; purchase of school equipment which can be used under field conditions, and also the means of protecting pupils and staff;

ii. further development of information-propaganda activity as a whole, but especially in connection with strengthening nationwide defense and social self-protection; building the most effective and coordinated information system for monitoring, guiding, directing and performing tasks in the fields of nationwide defense and social self-protection throughout the country; further improvement of the capability of agencies and organizations in the field of information and propaganda; and especially modernization and equipping with mobile radiobroadcasting, printing, film and other equipment, facilities so that they can inform one another and enter into agreement with one another, and other facilities that ensure successful functioning of this activity under all conditions; and continuation of the process of organizing the production of equipment and supplies for this activity (paper, ink, matrices, film, chemicals, radiobroadcasting devices, studio equipment, and other equipment and spare parts);

iii. development of health care on up-to-date principles, which encourage integrational processes, division of labor, specialization and association on the foundations of self-management and specialization; construction of the network and facilities in accordance with the established priorities and the pathology of the population, greater attention being paid at the same time to basic health care and the most sophisticated medicines; as well as further equipping of all the country's regions for health care of the public and armed forces in wartime, care being taken to bring the construction of health facilities and adaptation of other facilities into line with the needs for health care and social welfare in emergency situations and in wartime, to providing medical and other equipment for mobile hospitals, and to ensuring the necessary reassignment of personnel in wartime. Particular attention shall be paid to making provision for mobile teams and laboratories and also to reserves of blood, medicines, medical supplies, etc.;

iv. assurance of the necessary number of personnel in all skill categories for the functioning of economic and social-service activities in wartime by organizing a labor conscription system in peacetime which covers personnel in associated labor who have not been issued assignments to the armed forces and other able-bodied working people and citizens, from young people and housewives to pensioners, and also their professional training in peacetime to perform tasks in wartime;

v. improvement of conditions and intensification of the organized effort to inform, bring together, educate, indoctrinate and prepare Yugoslavs temporarily employed abroad so that they are bound still more closely to the homeland, to its defense and protection, and at the same time the best possible conditions are to be ensured for their return and reception under ordinary and also emergency conditions. To that end the parties to this agreement have agreed that in accordance with economic and social development and employment policy, they wil' continue to develop and concretize package programs and efforts for the gradual return of Yugoslavs from abroad and for their productive employment. Relevant methods are the

matching of social and personal capital, increasing opportunities for new jobs in small business, developing contract organizations of associated labor, cooperative relations in agriculture, etc.;

vi. greater integration of society's scientific research potential in researching a more independent overall development for the country and reduction of foreign dependence, in particular in researching the specific problems of developing nationwide defense and social self-protection in which the Federal Secretariat for National Defense has expressed an interest; correlation of the importation of foreign technology with the needs of defense and protection and assurance that the foreign know-how acquired is put to the best use for the country's future development and to strengthen its defense and security, and, along with the acquisition of foreign know-how, assurance of programs and funds for continuation of research, further incorporation of material on defense and protection in all scientific research programs and projects, and also broader use of scientific results in the fields of defense and protection, along with development of collaboration and financial aid of scientific research organizations by self-managed communities of interest;

vii. adaptation of programs for cultural and artistic activities for performance under wartime conditions; the safekeeping and protection of cultural resources, and development of physical education in accordance with the needs of the country's defense and protection.

Article 12

Bearing in mind as well the needs of nationwide defense and social self-protection, the parties to this agreement have agreed that it is indispensable to create the material and other conditions for still faster development of hilly and mountain regions, the border regions and islands, and in particular for the faster development of the relevant economic and social-service activities. Particular attention shall be paid to the faster development of sources of energy in general and of small-scale capacities using domestic resources in particular; to the development of relevant agricultural production, especially livestock raising, to the development of the timber industry and other sources of raw materials, to the processing of raw materials from agriculture and timbering and other raw materials, and also to the construction of relevant industrial plants which can be operated profitably in peacetime and which can contribute to holding the population in those regions. In addition to that, the infrastructure will be built and other preconditions will be created for fuller employment and for the life of the population in those regions, and to that end selective stimulative measures shall be undertaken.

Article 13

The parties to this agreement have agreed to pay particular attention to advancement of defense preparations in sociopolitical communities, especially to the defense preparations of administrative agencies and organizations and self-managed organizations and communities in view of their role in preparing and carrying out defense plans, but also in view of their tasks concerning the overall functioning of the socioeconomic system and sociopolitical system in peacetime and in wartime.

Article 14

In view of the need for more effective protection of people and property, it is indispensable that all entities in society commit themselves still more to further construction and more harmonious development of social self-protection as an enduring constitutional function and integral part of the regular activity of every entity.

To that end the parties to this agreement shall especially orient their efforts in the following directions:

i. toward further socialization of security and social protection through more complete and timely education and by informing the public about sociopolitical, socioeconomic and other developments and about problems and ways of overcoming them within communities where working people and citizens work and live, and informing them as well about issues of broader importance in order to create conditions for more direct participation of the working people and citizens in the coordinated measures and efforts of the system of defense and protection in order to protect the constitutional order, the system of self-management, social ownership and the constitutional freedoms and rights of the working people and citizens;

ii. toward coverage of the issues of security and protection in connection with every element in medium-term plans, especially from the standpoint of opposing the activity of the external and internal enemy, international terrorism, combating crime, transportation safety, fire prevention, physical and technical security of structures and grounds, public peace and order, security of the national border, protection of secret information and creation of conditions for its safekeeping in accordance with regulations in effect, and so on;

iii. in development of scientific research toward encouragement of the invention and adoption of domestic equipment for purposes of social self-protection and promotion of discovery of new forms of operation of forces for special warfare and improvement of protection and the effectiveness of opposition to an enemy, especially in the domain of foreign economic and other relations;

iv. toward assurance of further development of a supply of materiel and equipment (primarily from domestic sources) and their updating for the sake of more responsive and efficient functioning of specialized agencies and services for the protection of society, and toward assuring as well the necessary personnel with appropriate qualifications, experience and other attributes in accordance with the social principles of personnel policy which have been adopted, so that the function of the overall system of social self-protection is performed as fully as possible;

v. so that self-managed organizations and communities and sociopolitical communities, in conformity with their respective rights, duties and capabilities, provide the funds and assure other conditions for implementation of the policy governing the development of social self-protection as set forth in this agreement.

Article 15

In conformity with the rights and duties of the republics and autonomous provinces as set forth in the constitution and law, the parties to this agreement have agreed to set aside the necessary funds in accordance with their material capabilities, but no less than 0.40 percent of their national income, for performance of the tasks enumerated in Articles 6 through 14 of this agreement and for implementation of the development policy set forth in this agreement, and this is not to include funds for building, equipping and maintaining shelters.

Article 16

In accordance with the order on formation of reserves issued by the SFRY State Presidency, the parties to this agreement have agreed on the following:

a. faster formation, replenishment and renewal of commodity reserves of basic foodstuffs and industrial products important to the country's defense in the republics and autonomous provinces and the taking of appropriate steps related to those reserves in opstinas and certain organizations of associated labor, so that the level of commodity reserves envisaged by the order of the SFRY State Presidency is attained in 1985;

b. discovery and assurance of permanent and stable sources of financing for the formation, replenishment and renewal of commodity reserves of basic foodstuffs and industrial products;

c. discovery and assurance of permanent and stable sources of financing to build and equip the necessary storage space;

d. commencement of a broad-based public effort to create stores of basic foodstuffs in households to cover at least between 7 and 15 days of war;

e. coordination of construction of the necessary storage space with the formation, replenishment and renewal of reserves of basic foodstuffs and industrial products;

f. orientation of the location of commodity reserves toward the hilly and mountain regions, the islands and geostrategic areas in the republics and autonomous provinces;

g. creation of larger reserves and stocks for the supply of the cities and other centers of consumption so as to ensure an appropriately more uniform distribution of stocks and so as to make the country capable of more organized defense under all conditions;

h. orientation of the location of money, precious metals and similar valuable items for the country's emergency needs toward regions where adequate protection can be provided;

i. in sociopolitical communities and organizations of associated labor the drafting and mutual coordination of evacuation plans and plans for dispersal of

commodity reserves and also of the necessary commodity stocks in accordance with the needs of the armed forces and the public.

To that end social compacts and self-management accords should set forth the proportional makeup, amounts and location of commodity reserves by holders of such reserves, and in addition they should set forth measures for location of market surpluses of basic raw and processed foods in accordance with the needs of consumption for ordinary and extraordinary situations in peacetime and in wartime.

Article 17

In view of the fact that numerous public organizations such as the Federation of Reserve Military Officers, the Red Cross, the Firefighting Federation, Popular Technology--the Federation of Organizations for Popular Technical Education (the Automobile and Motorcycle Federation, the Federation of Amateur Radio Operators, the Aviation Federation, the Federation of Organizations for Astronautics and Rockets, Federations of Organizations for Activities on the Water and Underwater, etc.), the Rifle Federation, the Ski Federation, the Mountain-Climbing Federation, the Federation of Engineers and Technicians, federations of medical and pharmaceutical societies and federations of health-care personnel, "Partisan"--the Federation of Organizations for Physical Education and Athletic Recreation, the Federation of Scouts and other public organizations are making an important contribution to a stronger nationwide defense and social self-protection through the orientation adopted in their program and through the activities they have undertaken, the parties to this agreement have agreed that in their medium-term plans and measures they shall encourage the development of public organizations in the field of nationwide defense and social self-protection, help them to equip themselves and create other conditions for their activities in peacetime and also for their preparation for operation in wartime.

The parties to this agreement shall in particular aid and encourage activities of public organizations which contribute to organizing and training working people and citizens, especially young people, for armed combat and other forms of resistance; for performance of health-care, social-welfare and other humanitarian tasks; for firefighting; for dissemination of technical knowledge and for performance of other tasks of particular interest to nationwide defense and social self-protection.

Article 18

The parties to this agreement have agreed that in their medium-term social plans and particularly in their economic policy measures they shall encourage and ensure implementation of the agreed policy in the interest of a further strengthening of the country's unified system of defense and protection.

Article 19

This agreement shall be deemed concluded when it has been adopted by the Federal Executive Council, the executive councils of the assemblies of the republics and the executive councils of the assemblies of the autonomous provinces and when it

is confirmed by the SFRY Assembly, the assemblies of the republics and the assemblies of the autonomous provinces.

Article 20

This agreement shall be published in SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ.

On behalf of the Federal Executive Council, Veselin Djuranovic (signed), chairman of the Federal Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Bosnia-Hercegovina, Milanko Renovica (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Montenegro, Momcilo Cemovic (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Croatia, Pero Flekovic (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Macedonia, Blagoj Popov (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Slovenia, Janez Zemljaric (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Serbia, Ivan Stambolic (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SAP Kosovo, Bahri Oruci (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SAP Vojvodina, Nikola Kmezic (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

7045
CSO: 2800

REPUBLICS' AGREEMENT ON MILITARY WEAPONS, EQUIPMENT PRODUCTION, 1981-85

Belgrade SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ in Serbo-Croatian No 74, 31 Dec 80 pp 2253-2256

[Agreement among the Federal Executive Council, the executive councils of the republics and the executive councils of the autonomous provinces and the Community of the Yugoslav Industry of Armament and Military Equipment signed 18 December 1980 in Belgrade by their respective representatives]

[Text] AGREEMENT
On the Bases of the Social Plan of Yugoslavia in the Field of the Production of Armament and Military Equipment in the Period From 1981 to 1985

Article 1

The parties to this agreement (hereafter referred to as the "parties") hereby set forth their common interests and goals in development and production of armament and military equipment and the guidelines and outlines of economic policy measures and other measures which are to be undertaken by agencies of the Federation and the republics and autonomous provinces to achieve the common goals hereinafter set forth, and regulate mutual relations, rights and obligations in achievement of the common interests and goals which are to be achieved in the period from 1981 to 1985, in accordance with the program for construction and the production program referred to in the Law on Production of Armament and Military Equipment (hereafter referred to as the "Law").

Article 2

Common interests and goals in the development and production (hereafter referred to as "manufacture") of armament and military equipment in the period from 1981 to 1985 are as follows:

1) long-term and reliable assurance of the necessary types and amounts of armament and military equipment to meet the needs of the SFRY Armed Forces and other national defense needs in peacetime and wartime;

2) harmonious development of the manufacture of armament and military equipment so as to ensure optimum manufacture of armament and military equipment in peacetime and wartime, in accordance with the country's overall socioeconomic development;

3) maximum use of domestic raw materials and manufacturing materials and the greatest possible substitution of the most important raw materials and supplies in the manufacture of armament and military equipment;

4) adoption of up-to-date engineering, up-to-date technologies and up-to-date organization of the work process for the sake of higher efficiency in the economic employment of social assets and reduction of production costs of armament and military equipment;

5) construction of new facilities for development and manufacture of armament and military equipment and modernization, reconstruction and maintenance and use of existing ones, in accordance with the construction program referred to in the Law, in which, with due respect paid to the needs of national defense and in conformity with the relevant criteria, preference shall be given to construction of facilities in those republics and autonomous provinces in which that manufacturing has not in the past been sufficiently developed;

6) long-term direct linkage between organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment and other organizations of associated labor participating in the manufacture of armament and military equipment;

7) constant improvement, education and recruitment of specialists necessary for the optimum development of production of up-to-date armament and military equipment;

8) comprehensive development of scientific research and its linkage to society's scientific potential;

9) provision for and maintenance of the necessary reserves of raw materials, manufacturing materials and tools for the manufacture of armament and military equipment in peacetime and wartime;

10) encouragement and promotion of cooperation with particular countries, above all with the nonaligned countries and developing countries, on the basis of mutual interests and benefits.

Article 3

The parties are agreed that in accordance with the law the manufacture of armament and military equipment is an activity of particular interest.

Article 4

Mindful of the common interests and goals as set forth in Article 2 of this agreement, the parties have agreed that the Yugoslav Social Plan Covering the Period From 1981 to 1985, the social plans of the republics, the social plans of the autonomous provinces and the plans of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment shall provide for and ensure the material and other conditions which under the construction program and production program are indispensable to the manufacture of armament and military equipment so that the

armed forces of the SFRY and other components of nationwide defense are furnished armament and military equipment from domestic industry, and that within the limits of their respective rights, duties and responsibilities they shall undertake all necessary efforts and measures to fulfill plans for defense of the country, plans for developing, building and equipping the SFRY Armed Forces and war plans for the manufacture of armament and military equipment.

Article 5

The parties are agreed that through their activity, in conformity with laws and the policy governing the SFRY's economic and social development, they shall guide and encourage creation of conditions for faster pooling of labor and capital in the manufacture of armament and military equipment and the financing of the agreed development and production.

Article 6

Through their measures and activities and in conformity with their rights and duties the parties shall initiate and encourage the pooling of labor and capital in order to carry out the construction program and production program referred to in the Law and the conclusion of self-management accords among organizations of associated labor and other self-managed organizations and communities, within the framework of banks and other financial organizations, to channel a portion of the resources of the credit potential of banks and other financial organizations into achievement of the common interests and goals set forth in this agreement.

Article 7

The parties are agreed that the prices of armaments and military equipment, of finished products, of semifinished products, of assemblies, of subassemblies, of parts, of manufacturing materials, of raw materials and of other products and services which are particularly important to the manufacture of armament and military equipment shall be regulated in accordance with the criteria set forth in law, in the Social Compact on Prices of Armament and Military Equipment and Article 10 of the Law on Economic and Other Relations in the Manufacture and Sale of Armament and Military Equipment (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, No 25, 1979), other regulations and general self-management acts.

The parties are agreed that organizations of associated labor which do not deliver armament and military equipment, finished products, semifinished products, assemblies, subassemblies, parts, manufacturing materials, raw materials and other products, or do not render services, which are particularly important to the manufacture of armament and military equipment at the prices contained in the self-management accord on the bases of the joint plan for manufacture of armament and military equipment or contained in another general self-management act, or which do not set prices on those products and services in accordance with such acts, shall not be entitled to protection from payment of duties, import charges and taxes, nor shall they be entitled to incentives in foreign economic relations envisaged by this agreement.

Article 8

The Federation, the republics and the autonomous provinces are agreed that within the limits of their respective rights and duties, regulations and criteria for establishment of customs quotas and in the actual establishment of such quotas they shall provide the most favorable treatment to the importation of equipment, raw materials and manufacturing materials which are indispensable to the manufacture of armament and military equipment and which are not produced in the country or are produced in insufficient amounts or an inappropriate quality, provided they are necessary to fulfillment of the planned manufacture of armament and military equipment necessary to equip the SFRY Armed Forces and to meet other national defense needs.

Article 9

The parties are agreed that within the framework of Yugoslavia's foreign exchange system and balance of payments, and also in conformity with the provisions of the Law on Foreign Exchange Transactions and Credit Relations With Foreign Countries (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ, No 15, 1977) and the Law on Economic and Other Relations in the Manufacture and Sale of Armament and Military Equipment, priority in the use of foreign credits shall be accorded to fulfillment of the construction program and production program referred to in the Law.

Article 10

The parties are agreed that aside from customs duties and import charges, they shall also protect fulfillment of the construction program and production program referred to in the Law by other measures that exist in the system of foreign economic relations (encouragement and promotion of foreign trade and other foreign economic relations, etc.), as well as through measures in the domain of taxes and other charges.

Article 11

Organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment are agreed that they shall undertake all measures necessary to development and improvement of their mutual relations, business ties and cooperation in order to fulfill the construction program and production program referred to in the Law and to secure the necessary capacities and stimulate the pooling of labor and capital, taking as their point of departure that there is a single system of operation in the manufacture of armament and military equipment and that all those doing planning in the manufacture of armament and military equipment are mutually dependent, have mutual ties and bear mutual responsibility.

Organizations of associated labor which manfuacture armament and military equipment commit themselves to ensure performance of the tasks stated in Paragraph 1 of this article by coordinating their plans covering the period from 1981 to 1985 both directly and within the framework of the Community of the Yugoslav Armament and Military Equipment Industry by the conclusion of self-management accords on the bases of plans.

Article 12

The parties are agreed that aside from funds which in accordance with law are assured by organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment and the Federal Secretariat for National Defense, funds to finance the construction program and production program referred to in the Law may also be furnished under a social compact or self-management accord by other organizations of associated labor, other self-managed organizations and communities and sociopolitical communities.

Article 13

The parties are agreed that the Federal Secretariat for National Defense shall collaborate with the competent agencies of the republics and autonomous provinces in carrying out the construction program and production program referred to in the Law.

Article 14

The parties are agreed that in their measures and efforts they shall contribute to fulfillment of the construction program and production program referred to in the Law in order to ensure that the SFRY Armed Forces and other components of nationwide defense are furnished armament and military equipment from domestic industry.

Article 15

The parties are agreed that in accordance with the rights and duties set forth in the constitution and law and the established economic policy, they shall undertake efforts and measures to carry out the construction program and production program referred to in the Law, and specifically as follows:

i. to create stable conditions for economic activity in order to realize the particular social interest as established by law;

ii. to aid and encourage the pooling of labor and capital to provide the necessary funds to finance the construction program and production program referred to in the Law;

iii. to promote and encourage the export of armament and military equipment, engineering projects, services and other transactions in the domain of foreign economic relations related to armament and military equipment;

iv. to ensure priority in the material supply of the following to organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment: energy, raw materials, manufacturing and other materials both domestic and imported, including creation and maintenance of the necessary material reserves for the manufacture of armament and military equipment.

Article 16

The parties are agreed that the favorable treatment envisaged by this agreement or accorded on the basis of or in conformity with this agreement may be enjoyed only by organizations of associated labor which conclude a self-management accord on the bases of the joint plan for manufacture of armament and military equipment and other self-management accords envisaged by this agreement or concluded in order to implement it, under the further provision that they use that favorable treatment to carry out the joint plan for the manufacture of armament and military equipment.

Article 17

In conformity with their respective rights and duties the parties shall ensure that measures indispensable to preserving natural and man-made attributes of the environment shall be applied and pollution of the air, soil, water, sea, etc., prevented in fulfillment of the construction program and production program referred to in the Law.

Article 18

The parties commit themselves to organize monitoring of fulfillment of the common interests and goals set forth in this agreement and to inform one another about progress and problems in carrying out this agreement.

Article 19

The text of this article is given in the Annex of this agreement, which is to be published in SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ--Povjerljivo glasilo (Confidential Herald).

Article 20

This agreement has been signed by representatives of the Federal Executive Council, the executive councils of the assemblies of the republics, the executive councils of the assemblies of the autonomous provinces and bodies of self-management of organizations of associated labor manufacturing armament and military equipment, that is, the Community of Yugoslav Armament and Military Equipment Industry, in a corresponding number of identical copies, which are regarded as authentic text.

Article 21

This agreement shall take effect upon confirmation by the SFRY Assembly, the assemblies of the republics and the assemblies of the autonomous provinces.

Article 22

An annex of this agreement has been issued to accompany the agreement and is an integral part of it.

Article 23

This agreement shall be published in SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ.

On behalf of the Federal Executive Council, Veselin Djuranovic (signed), chairman of the Federal Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Bosnia-Hercegovina, Milanko Renovica (signed), chairman of the Execu-ive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Montenegro, Momcilo Gemovic (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Croatia, Pero Flekovic (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Macedonia, Blagoj Popov (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Slovenia, Janez Zemljaric (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SR Serbia, Ivan Stambolic (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SAP Kosovo, Bahri Oruci (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Executive Council of the Assembly of SAP Vojvodina, Nikola Kmezic (signed), chairman of the Executive Council

On behalf of the Community of the Yugoslav Armament and Military Equipment Industry, Gen Col Petar Babic (signed)

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BILIC DISCUSSES DISSIDENTS, OPPOSITION, CHURCH

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 19 Feb 81 p 5

[Article* by Jure Bilic: "Openness Toward All Well-Intentioned People"]

[Text] Aside from obvious difficulties of an economic nature, and they may be still greater, the situation in society is relatively satisfactory, we do not have any serious cases of irresponsibility and upheavals in society. There remains, however, the constant caution: everything, including bad things, are deemed to be good when the situation is good, but when the situation begins to change, then even the good can become bad.

Were we to assess the year 1980 in terms of certain indicators, for example, the number of strikes, which is taken as some kind of indicator of the situation with the working class, then we can be altogether satisfied. In 1980 there were 52 work stoppages in Croatia, they involved about 4,000 workers, and the average stoppage lasted just less than 7 hours. In the first 1.5 months of 1981 there have been six stoppages involving 520 workers and lasting 2.5 hours on the average. By and large the dissatisfaction concerned distribution of personal income, but very infrequently because of the actual amount, and far more often because criteria had not been devised to regulate distribution, which is to say that they occurred because of relations within the work force. I must say that intervention was rapid. The demands of the workers were met everywhere, since they were justified. This demonstrates that the activity of the organized social forces--the party, the trade unions, the professional management of factories and the bodies of workers' management in those organizations--was slack, and the organizations were ineffective. If it was possible to resolve the accumulated problems through a work stoppage, then they could have been resolved before that point. It is our task to see that the problems are not resolved by those methods, and we must follow with still closer attention the standard of living of the workers and the resolution of problems in society which give rise to this kind of resentment.

* Portion of the authorized text of a speech on current socioeconomic and sociopolitical issues in Croatia delivered on Thursday, 12 February, by Jure Bilic, president of the Croatian Parliament, to members of the Council of the Republic.

The Workers Are Making Mature and Responsible Judgments

It is taken for granted that the standard of living of the Yugoslav worker has dropped 9 percent, and that of the Croatian worker 6 percent. This has now been adjusted somewhat, since personal incomes were raised toward the end of the year and after the year-end accounts were drawn up.

The socioeconomic and political situation necessitates close contacts with organizations of associated labor, but this should become a standard method of operation. The comrades in the party presidium are visiting factories and talking to the workers about everything from prices and the situation in society to the most delicate issues in international economic and political relations. Once again it has been confirmed that the workers are making altogether mature and responsible judgments, but they are also criticizing certain things. We have frankly been asking them if they would strike and if they are dissatisfied. They have been responding that they would go so far as to strike if the self-management method of resolving a particular problem breaks down, but when the country is in question, they are unified behind its defense. In a factory which I visited on that occasion, it was said that only about 100 of the 1,000 workers were dissatisfied, but a large portion of those were people who are not our enemies. A small portion are malcontents, and there are isolated individuals who are hostile, but it is important to say that their comrades know about this and from the political standpoint are keeping abreast of it and acting....

Nor in our conversations with workers have we avoided another important topic, one which we dare not avoid. Our frank conversations are an important thing to this society, they pull us forward. I think that we have an economic situation even more difficult than certain other countries do, but we have fewer upheavals. But we should not delude ourselves that certain social upheavals cannot occur, at least on a local scale, and this could bring about further difficulties in our development....

Understanding the Time in Which We Live

Now here are a few of the adverse political and ideological tendencies. I will mention only this general atmosphere which you are also following and are familiar with. Which are the "opposition forces" at present? I think that it is not a question of opposition forces, it is a question of forces of the counterrevolution. After all, we must accept into our ranks those who are "against," but who would not betray this country, who would not serve anyone else. Those who are against us and who would betray the country and serve someone else, those people are counterrevolutionaries, and we must speak about them as a counterrevolution, and not as an opposition. But we may have an "opposition" even in our own ranks, people seeking a better solution, and so forth. At times this is even a good thing because it builds up critical thought.

At a meeting of the opstina committee in Karlovac I told the comrades that I was better satisfied at the meeting of the opstina committee in 1971 than now in 1981, even though the comrades made good reports and have been doing good work and have a good situation. At that time we were fighting to purge the ranks of the party

of chauvinist-nationalists and we were all mobilized and energetic, but now when no sort of great danger threatens, we have been lulled a bit. I therefore think that we must understand the time in which we live. I do not wish to overestimate those forces, they are not capable of anything much. But their activity is subject to foreign influence, to services and forces on the outside and the emigre community, since now the "Croatian question" is again one of the issues emphasized by certain groups outside the country, an issue which the Ustasha emigre community wants to revive.

Let me say a few words about these elements. By and large there is a vicious circle around those forces overthrown in 1971 and those defeated in the war. And when one looks at all this now, he becomes still more convinced how evil that was. Not only because the so-called mass movement arose, but because the dirty activity of individuals is still linked to the year 1971, and actually the links are to the forces defeated in the National Liberation Struggle. We should have exposed the true state of affairs to the world. This activity merely plays into the hands of terrorism and neofascism, which is collaborating with the extremist political emigre community. This opposition here, the nationalistic opposition, wants to cloak itself in democratic fleece and a so-called democratic alternative. That is the way they represent themselves in the world outside, and it is with that deception that they seek support outside.

They can indeed obtain it from certain democratically oriented newsmen, politicians and well-intentioned people, since the latter do not know what those people are really up to. When the world learns the real truth, which is that they want to break up the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, not only will that support fall away, but the democratic public will even condemn them. There are few who want to bring back the old relations. We must therefore portray them truthfully to the world as those who are breaking up this country and who ultimately mean a return to the past for the Socialist Republic of Croatia. After all, we know the significance of the Independent State of Croatia, we know what Macek wanted, and we know what the old Yugoslavia was all about.

Exposing Groups of Traitors

And because of the situation in the country we must expose this group around Veselica, Gotovac and others regardless of what they previously were, since objectively their activity leads to fascistization. The line which they took up, if it was not the Ustasha line, was at least a pro-Ustasha line and even more the line of Macek and the Croatian Peasant Party, a line like that of Tudjman. They want to break up this kind of Yugoslavia, saying that Croatia cannot realize its own interests within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. What does that mean? What does this amount to? By and large they establish links with hostile elements outside and have no sort of important support within the country. To be sure, there are tie-ups between the Croatian and Serbian nationalists and others, there are tie-ups with people of like mind in Slovenia. The Zagreb group is collaborating with Djilas; the Belgrade group, which wanted to publish the journal JAVNOST [PUBLIC], is also with him, and together they would like to portray themselves as a democratic alternative and progressive force by world standards. But actually this group is treasonous and stands for Serbian predominance and hegemony, and it,

too, should be exposed. Finally, Djilas' son is a Chetnik. He is now writing in Chetnik newspapers against our country. We need only tell the world the truth about these groups, since in essence they are plotting either hegemony or separatism. Often lies are told about this, and that is why they achieve solidarity. The most important thing for us is political action. The Croatian people and other nationalities and ethnic minorities living in Croatia know that there is no other alternative for this Croatia without this kind of Yugoslavia and this system. We should constantly explain this, not because of the 90 percent of the people who understand it and accept it, people who develop and confirm this in the revolution and the building of socialism, but because of those 10 percent (if there are that many) who tomorrow could be a Fifth Column. That is why we must constantly fight to affirm nationality policy and the rights of the Croatian people, Croats and all people who live in Croatia, as well as the rights of all the nationalities and ethnic minorities in the SFRY. It is especially important to us that we develop in Croatia fraternity between Croats and Serbs as well as their fraternity with the other nationalities and ethnic minorities in Yugoslavia, since this is the area in which our enemies wish to inflict the greatest damage on us. The emigre community is also involved in this. There are also forces outside the country which are playing a two-faced game with us.

On Verbal Crimes

There is a great deal of talk about petitions to "free political prisoners." I can tell you that there are very few such prisoners in our jails. In Croatia there are only 91, and the group of those convicted for so-called verbal crimes is the smallest of all. We should also make matters clear about this verbal concept. One must first know what kind of country we are and what kind of history we have had. We know this quite well, others do not. In our context a verbal political act is counterrevolutionary. To arouse religious or ethnic enmity is a counterrevolutionary act. History has taught us that. Consequently, we must explain to that portion of our public which does not know that what this "verbal" aspect is all about. This is not the same notion as in Germany, France, and America. We know best what proper understanding and proper solution of the nationality question and of all other social issues mean to us. Which is why we have few political prisoners. Let others tell how many they have.

Cominform forces are operating with varying intensity. They are always waiting for their time to come, but those forces are also operative within the country depending on overall relations among the great powers and on their attitudes toward us.

It is certain, however, that we want good relations with the East and the West, with all who respect us and give us equal treatment. I think today we have good relations with all countries, both the socialist countries and the countries of the West, and especially with the nonaligned countries.

Today people in the world are mainly interested in four global Yugoslav issues. The first pertains to the economic problems, how will Yugoslavia "pull out" of its difficulties? Second, will self-management survive, and third, will collective leadership function, and the so-called dissidents comes only in fourth place.

These questions are originating with different forces, both our friends who are interested in Yugoslavia, and also those who want to put pressure on our country, and this is used more as an element of pressure than in anticipation that there will be some change.

About the Religious Communities

Now a few words about the religious communities.

Over the last 1.5 years we have debated this quite a bit. First the presidium and then also the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, as well as other sociopolitical and self-managed organizations. Two years ago we also adopted resolutions on our future relations with the churches, and we are oriented toward better cooperation with the churches in our society. We have stated all this to representatives of the churches. We have emphasized that there were priests even in the National Liberation Struggle, even though others were on the side of the Independent State of Croatia. We must therefore constantly explain and interpret the policy of the churches and what is happening in them, especially in the Catholic Church.

Basically these are the same relations and same tendencies in the Orthodox Church and in others, except that some of those have a more constructive attitude toward our reality.

Within the Catholic Church there are three tendencies.

The first tendency, which is militant and does not involve many people, relies on the one hand on profascist elements, individuals inside and outside the church, and on the other it relies on Ustasha and other elements to feed it in World War II and the National Liberation Struggle, who are putting pressure on the church and through it wish to influence our relations and create positions for themselves wi' in the country. Some emphasize Stepinac (not only) for himself and the interests of the church, some to maintain the continuity of a defeated policy, and some for both reasons. This is not good. Representatives of this group want to be dominant in society. They do not recognize the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the way it is, or at least some of them think that Croatia is not equal in it, and it does not have enough independence of its own. They speak and write to the effect that they will not bind themselves to a political system, to parties and to a geopolitical solution in Yugoslavia. This group, clericalist or traditionalist, is not altogether unified, all the people within it are not operating in the same way, if I can put it that way. There are pressures on them, and then they vacillate. Sometimes they relent, but basically their orientation is Frankist [follower of Josip Frank, leader of the "pure" party of right following World War I--translator's note]. This group is subject to outside influence either of the Ustasha emigre community or of this group in the country around people who at one time were even in our movement. The principal pressure is exerted on the bishop's palace, he is encouraged to oppose our system and our order of things. That is why two high-level priests also signed a "petition." We told them that every year we declare amnesty two or three times and they might have proposed something to us so that we might jointly seek solutions if something needs to be done, but not with these hostile elements.

A visit cannot be made to our emigres who have shown great patriotism toward the Socialist Republic of Croatia and toward the SFRY without visiting our embassy with the excuse of certain other interests or so that "others" will not take it amiss. That is the duty of every citizen who bears a passport of his country. Whose interests are involved when the statement is made: "It is not a time to mention the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in public," when at the same time it is emphasized that the Croatian priests are also working in the interests of the Croatian people? For which Croatian people outside our socialist social system and outside this SFRY? They stress that everything is transient, only the church and the people are permanent. The Croatian people attained their freedom and their sovereignty for the first time through their voluntary commitment and by shedding their blood during the National Liberation Struggle and in their opposition to fascism and the Ustasha traitors and other traitors who have betrayed the Croatian people. And it has committed itself to live in a socialist community, in the Socialist Republic of Croatia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This is the sole interest of the Croatian people.

Religious People Are Also a Vigorous Factor in the Struggle for Socialism

Another tendency is that of integration. This group, so it says, is in favor of self-management and this kind of Yugoslavia, but it can accept self-management only if it is not atheistic. I think there is no dispute about this, since full freedom of religion and religious expression is guaranteed in our country. People forget the dialog on an equal footing. If every church has the right to interpret and advocate theism, other people outside the church also have the right to a different opinion. All people in this society are equal. We will not carry on a dialog of whether there is a God or not and argue about the activity of the churches within that framework which has been set down by our laws and the constitution.

Our attitude concerning atheism has long been known, nor is our commitment to the churches' freedom of activity anything new. But it is still said that now there must be a practical demonstration that behavior will conform to what was agreed on with the pope during the recent talks in Rome.

However, so long as relations develop solely on the basis of criticism and demands of one sort or another, along with harmful and hostile activity toward our reality as well, things will not be well. The church should clean up and regulate relations within its own framework in the same way as the social community has done in its domain by correcting the shortcomings that had been identified, and then a better development of relations will also be possible. That is why we cannot look upon the thesis of nonacceptance of self-management so long as it is "atheistic" as a definite tendency, but rather certain political goals are being objectively pursued by this group when they emphasize the problem of atheism. Some people say that they will not engage in politics, but they say that the churches are not only priests, but also the congregations as well. This, then, signifies depoliticization of church members, and there are tendencies toward creating political organizations of laymen. However, religious people are a vigorous factor in the st uggle for socialism. Just as they participated in the National Liberation Struggle

with guns in their hands, so today they are active in developing socialist self-management. These are attitudes which should be accepted, and then everything will go more easily.

The Dispute With the Enemies of Our Community

The third tendency is made up of the so-called loyalists, people who are well-intentioned, who want the church to operate in conformity with the constitution and law, and who accept the SFRY as it is. They have made quite a few public statements and have done some practical things which were good. It is especially important that this orientation is being accepted by the clergy at the lower level and also by an increasing number of bishops. Consequently, we should state clearly and explicitly that it is not a question of the churches' freedom to act, that is not the issue, but of a dispute with those forces which take a negative and hostile political attitude toward our community, toward the SFRY and toward the Socialist Republic of Croatia. That is the thing that is harmful to our socialis' republic, to the Croatian people, and indeed to the SFRY as a whole and all the nationalities and ethnic minorities and all people, be they religious or not.

Incidentally, we can easily disarm those whose intentions are not good when they say that the church cannot develop freely. Since the war more than 900 churches in Croatia have been built back and rebuilt, and about 300 new ones have been built or are under construction. We are now taking that inventory, and we will be presenting the precise figures to the world public and our own public.

The other things you already know. Our comrades have spoken about this. I think that our basic strategy is to open up more and more toward all well-intentioned people who want to work energetically for the well-being of all people and all nationalities and ethnic minorities in the SFRY. Likewise it is for us to oppose with all possible means, publicly, those forces which want to tear down our community, to expose them and to win the battle in the masses for this policy, which is a humanistic policy, a policy based on human rights [humana i ljudska politika], in our socialism and socialist self-management.

So let each church combat its own dogmatism and its abuse for political purposes, and let it not think that the moment has come to exert pressure on society. In our own ranks we must combat individuals who engage in sectarianism and we must carry on a still better organized and stronger political and ideological battle. Our long-range strategy in relations with the churches is to develop good relations, for everyone to do his job according to the law and the constitution, and that is the best for our nationalities, for their prosperity, and it is the only acceptable one in this breathless world.

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March 20, 1981